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Abstract 
 
In 1994, the first democratically elected government in South Africa faced the significant task of 
shaping new institutions and delivery transmission mechanisms capable of developing and 
implementing policies aimed at inclusive socio-economic growth and development. Evidence shows 
that the South African public sector is generally not yet able to be a key driver of development, at 
least not to the extent required to reduce poverty and inequality to the levels envisioned in the 
National Development Plan.   
 
The study argues that comprehensive public sector reform based on the principles of New Public 
Management was inappropriate given the unique South African political and institutional context and 
that incremental approaches to development are more likely to achieve results. This leaves room for 
the emergence of islands of effectiveness where public entrepreneurs or multi-stakeholder governed 
arrangements could be employed as alternative or complementary delivery transmission 
mechanisms. 
 
Operation Phakisa, an adaptation of the Malaysian Big Fast Results methodology, introduced a 
radical new approach to improving government impact. The Operation Phakisa methodology made 
certain assumptions about (or perhaps deliberately ignored) prevailing principal-agent relationships 
in South Africa and the readiness of these relationships to be challenged and transformed.  
 
Through the development and application of an analytical framework, the study examines the role of 
islands of effectiveness (using the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa as a case study) as possible 
alternative or complementary delivery transmission mechanisms.  While the Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa did not create sufficient scope for multi-stakeholder governance arrangements, 
some initiatives, most notably the Oil and Gas initiative, did benefit from public entrepreneurs that 
were able to navigate complex political and institutional realities to achieve results. 
 
Based on the outcome of the analysis, the study concludes with recommendations that could 
enhance the effectiveness of future iterations of Operation Phakisa. 
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The new South Africa that emerged in 1994 inherited institutions shaped by centuries of oppressive 
and divisive government policies. The first democratically elected government faced the significant 
task of shaping new institutions and delivery transmission mechanisms capable of developing and 
implementing policies aimed at inclusive socio-economic growth and development. Evidence shows 
that the South African public sector is generally not yet able to be a key driver of development, at 
least not to the extent required to reduce poverty and inequality to the levels envisioned in the 
National Development Plan (National Planning Commission (NPC), 2012). 
 
After visiting Malaysia in August 2013, President Jacob Zuma tasked the Department of Planning, 
Monitoring an Evaluation (DPME) to adopt the Malaysian Big Fast Results (BFR) methodology as a 
new approach to improve government policy development and implementation in South Africa. After 
the initial work done by DPME, Cabinet in March 2014 approved the piloting of Operation Phakisa, 
which means “hurry up” in Sesotho, focusing on the oceans economy in South Africa (Department 
of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), 2015b). 
 
Operation Phakisa introduced (or promised) a radical new approach to improving government 
impact. The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa aimed to leverage South Africa’s substantial and 
underutilised coastal resources to create employment opportunities and to contribute to the reduction 
of poverty and inequality (Walker, 2014). The Operation Phakisa methodology made certain 
assumptions about (or perhaps deliberately ignored) the nature of principal-agent relationships in 
the South African public sector, and the readiness of these relationships to be challenged and 
transformed. 
 
This study examines the capacity of the South African bureaucracy to be a key driver of development 
and the role of incremental approaches or islands of effectiveness (using Operation Phakisa as a 
case study) as possible alternative or complementary delivery transmission mechanisms. 
 
 Background 
History shows that countries, such as those in East Asia, that were able to overcome their 
developmental challenges did so by constructing developmental states (Edigheji, 2010, p. vii) that 
prioritised inclusive economic growth, equal opportunities and the equitable distribution of socio-
economic rewards (Naguib & Smucker, 2009, p. 100). Whether one prescribes to the political school 
which emphasises the capacity of the state to be developmental, or the economic school which 
emphasises appropriate economic policies, as described by Fine (2010, pp. 170-171) is not the focus 
of this study. The emphasis is rather on whether the South African Government considered South 
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Africa’s complex history, political settlements and institutional realities in shaping unconventional 
institutions and practices on the road to development (Butler, 2010, pp. 184-185). 
 
An analysis of economic data, selected development indicators and public opinion in Chapter 3 
suggests that socio-economic development in South Africa is not proceeding at a sufficient pace. 
While there are many factors that determine the success of a developmental state, this study 
focusses specifically on the delivery transmission triangle between citizens/clients, politicians/policy 
makers and the bureaucracy as service providers, or the long and short roads to accountability as 
described by the World Bank (2004, p. 6), and islands of effectiveness or incremental approaches 
to achieve developmental goals as described by Levy (2014) and others. 
 
Statistics suggest that the South African Government has been very effective (if not always efficient) 
at delivering essential outputs such as schools, clinics and houses (The Presidency, 2014), but not 
as successful at constructing what Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock (2013) refer to as the more 
complex human systems (“the State”) that leverage these outputs to achieve outcomes such as 
actual learning and less poverty. 
 
Based on the evidence cited, the study proposes that comprehensive public sector reforms in South 
Africa based on New Public Management (NPM) principles did not adequately consider prevailing 
political settlements and institutional complexities and how these would impact principal-agent 
relationships. As a result, the South African public sector is generally not yet able to be a key driver 
of development. Within this context, the study investigates more incremental approaches to public 
sector reform as proposed by authors such as Levy (2014), Andrews et al. (2013) and Ostrom (1990). 
 
These incremental approaches may create an environment in which developing countries can avoid 
what Andrews et al. (2013) refer to as capability traps, where governments and organisations that 
aim to achieve comprehensive ‘good governance’ reforms resort to pretending to reform “by 
changing what policies or organisations look like rather than what they actually do”. This is also 
referred to as ‘isomorphic mimicry’ where governments introduce reforms aimed more at enhancing 
external legitimacy and support, than actual improvement in performance and delivery (Andrews et 
al., 2013). 
 
The study will examine Operation Phakisa as a collection of smaller initiatives that may have resulted 
in the emergence of islands of effectiveness or “narrowly-focussed initiatives that combine high-
quality institutional arrangements at the micro-level and narrowly-targeted policy reforms” (Levy, 
2011) to achieve developmental results. 
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 Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to: 
a) Assess the impact of comprehensive public sector reforms based on NPM principles and the 
capacity of the South Africa public sector to support development. 
b) Consider whether Operation Phakisa was a genuine attempt at doing things differently or mere 
isomorphic mimicry. 
c) Determine whether the implementation of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa resulted in 
the emergence of two specific (not mutually exclusive) types of islands of effectiveness: 
 Public or bureaucratic entrepreneurship where one or a few individuals effectively managed 
or overcome hierarchical challenges to achieve results (PE Islands). 
 Multi-stakeholder governance arrangements driven by shared objectives and rewards that 
did not depend on bureaucratic accountability hierarchies to achieve results (MS Islands). 
 
 Objectives 
The study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
 
a) To compose, through the application of contemporary theories on constructing developmental 
states, appropriate analytical frameworks that can: 
 Explain the South African political and institutional context and implications for public sector 
reform; and 
 Define the concepts of and distinguish between public entrepreneurship and multi-
stakeholder governance. 
 
b) To apply the aforementioned analytical frameworks in a review and analysis of public sector 
reforms in South Africa and the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa in order to determine: 
 The implications of the South African political and institutional context for public sector 
reforms and the effectiveness of current delivery transmission mechanisms. 
 Whether the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa was a genuine attempt at introducing new 
delivery transmission mechanisms, or mere isomorphic mimicry. 
 Whether the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa created the opportunity for the emergence 
of public entrepreneurs and/or multi-stakeholder governed initiatives that resulted in islands 
of effectiveness. 
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 Problem statement and hypothesis 
Comprehensive public sector reform may not have been appropriate given the nature of political 
settlements and institutional complexity in South Africa. The capacity of the public sector in general 
to support development has significant implications for the design and implementation of initiatives 
such as Operation Phakisa. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis A1: Public sector reform based on NPM principles was appropriate given the South 
African political and institutional context. 
 
Hypothesis A1 will be tested using an analytical framework developed in the study as well as through 
an analysis of economic and other data. If Hypothesis A1 is not refuted, any failure of Operation 
Phakisa to deliver results could most likely be attributed to its own internal design and 
implementation processes, rather than the broader political and institutional context and public sector 
capacity. If Hypothesis A1 is refuted then the public sector, in general, would not have the capacity 
to fully support development. The design and implementation of the Oceans Economy Operation 
Phakisa would, therefore, have to have been a deliberate and considered attempt at doing things 
differently to avoid isomorphic mimicry that reinforced rather than escaped capability traps. This 
forms the basis of the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis A2: The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa designed and implemented effective 
institutions and delivery transmission mechanisms that was appropriate given the South African 
political and institutional context. 
 
Hypothesis A2 will be tested by analysing effectiveness (actual achievement of targets). If 
Hypothesis A2 is not refuted then the design of Operation Phakisa is likely to have been context-
appropriate. If Hypothesis A2 is refuted it would suggest that the design of Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa did not sufficiently consider the unique South African political and institutional 
realities and that it was therefore mere isomorphic mimicry, rather than a genuine attempt at doing 
things differently. 
 
The four possible scenarios that could emerge from testing Hypotheses A1 and A2 are summarised 
in Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1: Hypothesis A scenario matrix 
Hypothesis A2 not refuted A2 refuted 
A1 not refuted Scenario 1. Public sector capacity is 
unlikely to be a limiting factor in 
development and the design and 
implementation of Operation Phakisa were 
appropriate given this context. 
Incremental approaches useful 
Scenario 2. The effectiveness of 
Operation Phakisa was limited by its own 
design, rather than broader public sector 
capacity. 
Incremental approaches useful 
 
A1 refuted Scenario 3. While public sector capacity 
did not create an enabling environment, 
Operation Phakisa was able to overcome 
this limitation through context-appropriate 
design and implementation. 
Incremental approaches important 
Scenario 4. The effectiveness of 
Operation Phakisa was limited by both 
broader public sector capacity as well as 
its own design. 
Incremental approaches essential 
Source: Author 
 
Operation Phakisa may have, either intentionally or unintentionally, created an opportunity for the 
emergence of islands of effectiveness that achieved actual results. While none of the four scenarios 
above would limit the emergence of islands of effectiveness, the importance (or essentiality) of the 
emergence of islands of effectiveness for the achievement of actual developmental results varies for 
each scenario: Incremental approaches or islands of effectiveness would be useful but not essential 
under scenarios 1 and 2, but could play an important role or even be essential to the achievement 
of developmental results under scenarios 3 and 4. The following two hypotheses therefore focuses 
specifically on the emergence of two types of islands of effectiveness: 
 
Hypothesis B1: The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa created an opportunity for public 
entrepreneurs to emerge and establish islands of effectiveness that achieved results. 
 
If Hypothesis B1 is refuted it would suggest that islands of effectiveness driven by public 
entrepreneurs did not emerge during the design or implementation of the Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa. 
 
Hypothesis B2: The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa created an opportunity for the 
establishment of multi-stakeholder governed islands of effectiveness that achieved results. 
 
If Hypothesis B2 is refuted it would suggest that the design and implementation of the Oceans 
Economy Operation Phakisa did not result in the emergence of multi-stakeholder governed islands 
of effectiveness. 
 
The hypotheses discussed above are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that different initiatives 
under Operation Phakisa proved to be effective (or ineffective) for different reasons. 
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 Methodology and limitations 
1.5.1. Methodology 
The study employs a mixed-methods approach using quantitative as well as qualitative methods to 
achieve the stated objectives. The analysis of public sector capacity in South Africa is conducted 
primarily through an analysis of secondary data. 
 
Case studies are particularly useful to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms 
in the context of individual cases and to address causal complexity (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). 
Process tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process, the causal chain and the causal 
mechanism between an independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variable,” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Through process tracing and by examining causal mechanisms, 
the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa is used as a case study to determine whether public 
entrepreneurship and/or multi-stakeholder islands of effectiveness can (or did) emerge to drive 
developmental objectives. 
 
The first part of this study employs a desktop review using literature on contemporary theories of 
development and content analysis to explore and define contextual frameworks in order to: 
 Describe and classify political and institutional contexts and how these interact to create 
accountability for the delivery of goods and service to citizens; 
 Distinguish between normal bureaucratic, public entrepreneurship (PE) and multi-stakeholder 
governed (MS) delivery transmission mechanisms; 
 Define and describe islands of effectiveness as possible incremental approaches to public sector 
reform. 
 
An analysis of secondary data sources is used to locate South Africa within the defined 
political/institutional contextual framework to determine whether a reliance on NPM accountability 
chains is appropriate and likely to achieve developmental goals. 
 
Monitoring data on the implementation of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa was sourced 
from progress reports and other information available from the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit. This 
data was used to determine if the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa participants have to date 
been able to complete the activities necessary to achieve the intended objectives. Primary data 
obtained from interviews with key participants in the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa process 
was used to triangulate and interpret progress reports and data. 
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Permission was obtained from the Director General of DPME to utilise unpublished data and reports 
and to interview government employees. The prescribed ethical rules related to interviews and the 
confidentially of views expressed by interviewees were adhered to. 
 
1.5.2. Limitations 
Operation Phakisa progress reports data is provided to the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit by 
Operation Phakisa Delivery Units. It is not possible to verify the accuracy of the data provided by the 
Delivery Units. 
 
While the study suggests a correlation between public sector reform and the impact of government 
policies on indicators such as poverty and inequality, the analysis does attempt to prove direct 
causality. The study assumes that government policies were generally appropriate and proposes 
that a lack of impact would be attributable to constraints at the policy implementation rather than the 
policy development level. 
 
The study does not attempt to assess the broader and longer-term impact of Operation Phakisa. The 
focus is primarily on whether or not targets are actually achieved and on the underlying reasons for 
these successes or failures. 
 
An extensive literature search using several academic search engines did not reveal any substantial 
academic literature focusing specifically on Operation Phakisa. The Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation commissioned an evaluation of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa 
in 2017. While the initial inception report of this evaluation makes extensive reference to countries 
such as Malaysia, India and Tanzania, there is no reference to academic literature specifically 
focusing on Operation Phakisa in South Africa (Genesis Analytics, 2017). 
 
 Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2 
Contemporary theories of development are studied and used to define contextual frameworks to: 
 Describe and classify political and institutional realities and development trajectories; 
 Define and describe islands of effectiveness and incremental approaches to public sector reform; 
 Distinguish between normal bureaucratic, PE and MS driven delivery transmission mechanisms. 
 
These frameworks will in further chapters be applied to South Africa to predict what the effect that a 
particular set of political and institutional realities would have on development and (more importantly) 
explain why, given a specific political and institutional context, political and institutional arrangements 
either supported or constrained development. This chapter further provides a brief overview of the 
rationale and that lead to the introduction of Operation Phakisa in South Africa. 
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Chapter 3 
Provides an overview of the relevant political and institutional developments in South Africa and in 
Malaysia. A comparison of the development trajectories of the two countries provides an initial 
indication of whether sufficient similarities existed to support the adoption of the Malaysian BFR 
methodology by South Africa. 
 
The analytical frameworks described in Chapter 2, as well as an analysis of economic data and other 
relevant development indicators, are used to determine whether South Africa’s approach to 
development and public sector reform sufficiently considered the unique South African context. This 
analysis is then used to test Hypothesis A1 and to provide context for the detailed analysis of the 
Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Chapter 4 
Provides a brief overview of how the Malaysian BFR approach was adapted to the prevailing South 
African context. This chapter further analyses the originally intended governance arrangements for 
Operation Phakisa as well as how these arrangements were adjusted during the implementation of 
the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa. 
 
This is followed by a detailed analysis of the initial Oceans Economy labs that took place in 2014, 
key issues emerging from the October 2015 review workshop and progress report data as at July 
2017. This analysis is then used to test Hypotheses A2, B1 and B2 and to identify the most effective 
(in terms of meeting targets) focus area for further analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 
This chapter focusses specifically on the Oil and Gas sub-stream of the Oceans Economy Operation 
Phakisa to further examine the design and effectiveness of Operation Phakisa institutions as well as 
the possible emergence of islands of effectiveness based on PE or MS arrangements by testing 
Hypotheses B1 and B2. 
 
Chapter 6 
Summarises the findings of the study and proposes possible changes in approach that could improve 
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The objective of the literature review was to find and consolidate literature on the following concepts 
central to the problem statement: 
 Governance and the emergence of NPM. 
 Governance and political/institutional context. 
 Accountability as both a political and a managerial challenge. 
 Multi-stakeholder governance. 
 Public entrepreneurship. 
 Measuring development and governance. 
 
The literature review also provides background on the introduction of the Operation Phakisa 
methodology in South Africa and how this methodology was intended to improve government policy 
refinement and impact. 
 
The chapter concludes by summarising the academic literature into an analytical framework that can 
be used to: 
 Describe and classify political and institutional realities and how these interact to create 
accountability for the delivery of goods and service to citizens; 
 Distinguish between normal bureaucratic, PE and MS approaches to delivery; 
 Define and describe islands of effectiveness as possible incremental approaches to public sector 
reform. 
 
 Governance and the emergence of NPM 
Governance, in the context of the state, consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised. The traditional Weberian model of the public sector is characterised by the 
explicit division of labour among different parts of the bureaucracy based on hierarchical structures; 
rule-based decision-making; meritocratic recruitment and a predictable career path for bureaucrats 
(Levy, 2014, p. 138). Weber emphasised control from top to bottom where policy is set at the top by 
politicians and implemented through a series of strict rule-based manager-subordinate (or principal-
agent) relationships. In this model, the role of the bureaucrat is therefore strictly subordinate to the 
political superior (Pfiffner, 2004, p. 1). 
 
During the 1980s a growing disillusionment with conventional best practice and top-down 
approaches to planning and managing development projects saw the emergence of participative 
process approaches that emphasised experimentation, learning from doing, adapting and organic 
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expansion (Bond & Hulme, 1999, p. 1339). The traditional Weberian view of public administration 
could not effectively support process approaches to development (Pfiffner, 2004, p. 1) 
 
A process approach, in essence, recognises that development is a complex or “messy business” 
where evidence from both failed and successful attempts at achieving inclusive economic growth 
and social transformation show that complex country-specific realities often limit the effectiveness of 
many seemingly desirable policies (Levy, 2014, p. 10). There is therefore no single formula or best 
practice that guarantees success and states can and have pursued their own distinctive and 
unorthodox routes to rapid growth (Butler, 2010, p. 185).  
 
The main characteristics of process approaches to development include flexibility in design and 
implementation, learning from doing or iterative improvement, participation and empowerment of 
stakeholders, political support and appropriately devolved authority and sufficient institutional 
capacity (Bond and Hulme, 1999, pp. 1341-1342).  
 
NPM philosophy, systems and tools that developed over the past three decades shifted the focus of 
control from inputs to outputs and outcomes (Levy, 2014, p. 138) and sought to re-align the 
relationship between political principals and a new cadre of expert managers, changing the focus of 
public management to the citizen as client (Kapucu, 2006, pp. 887-888). NPM viewed the 
transformation of institutions as a range of management challenges (Levy, 2014, p. 135) related to 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion, improving skills, making public systems more efficient and 
stamping out waste and abuse (Levy, 2014, p. 138). This had significant implications for how 
government policies and programmes were designed and implemented. 
 
Traditional strategic planning was increasingly being replaced by strategic thinking that required a 
broader consideration of issues rather than finding one right answer (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 108). NPM 
theory therefore covers a broad spectrum from entrepreneurship at one pole to traditional 
hierarchical bureaucracy at the other. In essence, NPM requires that public systems clarify their 
fundamental purposes, eliminate unnecessary functions, and organise what they do and how they 
do it in a manner that contributes to the system’s overall purpose (Dunn & Miller, 2007, p. 354). 
 
In terms of NPM, the roles of principals (politicians and policymakers) are to define what needs to 
be done by setting clear performance targets (or key performance indicators – KPI’s), rewards for 
achieving targets and penalties for not meeting them and by giving agents (front-line providers) wider 
discretion to decide how these targets should be achieved (Levy, 2014, p. 138).  
 
The introduction of the outcomes approach as part of a wider shift to NPM in South Africa and 
Operation Phakisa as a methodology to understand problems and implement solutions, as discussed 
Chapter 2 
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further on in the study, should be viewed in the context of this broader theory of process thinking, 
NPM and how these evolved in South Africa and impacted on development. 
 
 Governance and political/institutional context 
North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as the rules of the game, or the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction. Formal institutions such as laws and informal institutions such as 
cultural norms can be deliberately created or can evolve over time. The nature of the “game” depends 
on the effectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement of these rules (North, 1990, p. 4). 
 
Regardless of form or function, the centrality and important role of the state and competent and 
cohesive public institutions in the developmental process is undeniable (Mkandawire, 2010, p. 61). 
There is, however, no single formula for designing such institutions. The successful construction of 
a developmental state should be a continually reflexive process of exploration and experimentation 
without losing sight of both local and wider contexts (Evans, 2010, p. 37). 
 
Levy (2014) supported by Andrews (2013) and Butler (2010) show that institutional reforms often fail 
because they do not consider country-specific realities. Fukuyama (2014, p. 35) adds institutional 
rigidity as a further important barrier to institutional reform. In order to understand and analyse the 
complex delivery transmission mechanisms present in modern governance arrangements in South 
Africa, it is necessary to understand the political and institutional context within which these 
mechanisms operate Levy (2014). The application of process approaches to development thinking 
therefore needs to consider the country-specific context within which these processes unfold and 
how the political and policy orientation, as well as the institutional architecture, affect how 
development is viewed, translated into policy and implemented (Edigheji, 2010, p. 4). 
 
Prior to the 1980s, most developing countries and international agencies failed to pay sufficient 
attention to the development of appropriate governance capabilities required to implement 
developmental strategies (Khan, 2008, p. 108). From the 1980s, the second phase of development 
policy focussed on structural adjustment that attempted to address the budgetary crisis in many 
developing countries caused by earlier development policies, also failed to sufficiently address 
governance reform (Khan, 2008, p. 109). This led to the development of good governance 
capabilities becoming an integral part of development strategy (Khan, 2008, p. 110). While there is 
general agreement that governance is one of the critical factors determining the growth prospects of 
countries, there is little agreement on which governance priorities and types of governance 
capabilities are critical (Khan, 2008, p. 108). 
 
Levy (2014) devised a development typology to classify country-specific contexts for descriptive, and 
to some extent also for predictive purposes. Each of the four country types described below in Table 
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2-1 implies distinctive incentives for participants, constraints and risks that affect how development 
can happen (Levy, 2014, p. 17). 
 
Table 2-1: Development Typologies 
  Organisational / institutional complexity 



















Strong political leadership with a 
substantial grip on power. Institutions 
weak 
Rule-by-law 
Political control monopolised but 




Competitive politics/institutions weak 
and personalised 
Rule-of-law 
Competitive politics with more 
impersonal institutional rules of the 
game 
Adapted from Levy (2014, p. 16) 
 
The way in which governance and growth interact to kick-start or sustain development varies along 
the dominant and competitive trajectories (Levy, 2014, p. 120). Growth along the dominant trajectory 
is supported by bureaucratic capability and consistent longer-term oriented leadership while growth 
along the competitive trajectory is supported by the emergence of islands of effectiveness (Levy, 
2014, p. 120), the latter being the primary focus of this study. Regardless of the trajectory, Fukuyama 
(2014, p. 30) points out that countries where democracy preceded modern state-building generally 
found it more difficult to achieve high-quality governance than those where good governance 
preceded democracy. 
 
The effectiveness of ambitious public sector reforms along the dominant trajectory depends on the 
orientation of political leaders (developmental v.s. rent-seeking) and on the extent to which these 
leaders have control over state power (Levy, 2014, p. 143). Along the competitive trajectory, 
ambitious public sector reforms are likely to succeed when political contestants, despite differing 
policy platforms, have shared incentives for a capable public sector to be in place (Levy, 2014, p. 
143). 
 
A key element of institutional context is the nature and extent of rent-seeking, where rents are broadly 
defined as returns that exceed the opportunity cost of resources that might otherwise be deployed 
in a competitive market (Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 88-90). This can take the form of patronage (access 
to jobs) and access to resources (directly or indirectly through procurement contracts). In settings 
with more personalised institutions, the discretionary conferral or threat of withdrawal of access to 
rents plays an important part in both the political and institutional dimensions described above (Levy, 
2014, p. 23). 
 
Levy (2014) proposes incremental approaches towards achieving ‘good governance’ in countries 
where “the incentives, authority and long-term horizon needed for comprehensive reform to take 
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hold will be lacking” and where instead “politics is open and competitive, but power is fragmented 
and contested, time horizons are short, and the rules of the game are personalised” (Levy, 2014, p. 
133). Such incremental approaches are based on a theory of change “where micro-level initiatives 
provide a platform for the emergence of ‘islands of effectiveness’ within a broader sea of dysfunction, 
securing some gains in the short term, and serving as a platform for cumulative gains over the longer-
run in both governance and poverty reduction” (Levy, 2014, p. 133). 
 
This study will consider the implications of the South African political and institutional context for 
public sector reform and the roles of the public sector and micro-level initiatives such as Operation 
Phakisa in development. 
 
 Development and accountability 
The 2004 World Development report proposed that, although the bureaucracy and institutional 
arrangements played an important role in development, failures in relationships of accountability 
were at the core of under-performing developmental states (World Bank, 2004). This led to the 
recognition of a complex principal-agent accountability chain that needs to function for development 
to take place. 
 
The long route to accountability refers to a series of principal-agent relationships (Figure 2-1) with 
the clients as principals and politicians as agents (politicians elected to deliver the goods/services 
required by the electorate) and the politicians as principals and providers as agents (to provide the 
goods/services) to citizens. The nature of principal-agent relationships within delivery organisations 
is significantly influenced by the governance arrangements (Weberian v. NPM) described earlier in 
this chapter (World Bank, 2004). 
 
Figure 2-1: WDR Accountability triangle 
Adapted from Levy (2014, p. 142) 
The State 
Politicians and policy makers 
(Settlement Strong or Weak) 
Citizens / Clients 
(Non-poor/Poor) 
(Coalitions and inclusion) 
Providers 
Management 
Frontline Organisations  
Client power 
Goods/Services 
Long route to  
accountability 
Short route to  
accountability 
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Bureaucratic limitations are most notable within two key principal-agent relationships (Sabel & 
Jordan, 2015, p. 8): 
 The high-level relationship between politicians and public managers, which can be hamstrung by 
either ignorance of the needs of the governing party or by political capture. 
 The mid-level relationship between public managers and front-line bureaucrats that is usually 
rules-based and affected by either ill-specified rules and goals or managers and front-line 
bureaucrats acting for private advantage. 
These limitations are compounded by the need to coordinate actions across distinct agencies (or 
silos) to deliver effective services. 
 
A linear model of improving public administration is based on the premise that problems can be 
largely solved ex-ante, by separating planning and execution. Top-level principal-agent relationships 
are solidified and can be made immune to capture by convening a large enough number of 
stakeholders to set goals transparently (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, p. 8). Mid-level principal-agent 
relationships can be improved by translating agreed-upon goals into clear targets and precise 
metrics and entering into agreements with managers, allowing discretion in the execution of tasks 
and rewarding progress or punishing non-performance. Problems of coordination across 
bureaucracies can be addressed by giving top-level officials from different organisations linked goals 
and incentives (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, p. 8). 
 
A recursive model of improving public administration is based on the premise that problem-solving 
is a continuous process (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, p. 9). In contrast to the linear model, this approach 
regards plans as provisional and encourages a process of monitoring aimed at diagnosing the 
underlying causes of problems in implementation and the adjustment of plans based on the 
information gained through implementation. Principals and agents are required to solve or escalate 
problems or be “penalised” by higher review bodies (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, p. 9). 
 
The accountability chains have important implications for public sector reform. In countries 
characterised by a dominant political settlement and relatively impersonal institutions, the long road 
to accountability (or a more linear model) is likely to function well and comprehensive public sector 
reforms could succeed (Levy, 2014, p. 143). Public sector reform in countries with a more contested 
political settlement and more personalised institutions is more likely to succeed if approached 
recursively or incrementally (Levy, 2014, p. 143) by focusing  on specific aspects of reform such as: 
Merit-based recruitment and market-related remuneration, improved financial management and 
oversight, and targeting specific (less contested) sectors of the public service first. 
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In the short run, client-driven participatory processes can potentially offer gains in accountability that 
are not yet embedded public institutions (Levy, 2014, p. 137). 
 
This study examines the effectiveness of accountability chains in the South African public sector and 
the role of initiatives such as Operation Phakisa to overcome non-functioning accountability chains. 
 
 Multi-stakeholder governance 
Ostrom (1990) developed a theory of collective action whereby “… a group of principals can organise 
themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of their own efforts”. Personalised-competitive settings 
are likely to be characterised by high levels of ambiguity that undercut the principal-agent 
relationships required for the long and short routes to accountability to function (Levy, 2014, p. 148). 
MS governance or collaborative governance expands the concepts of long and short routes to 
accountability by focusing on alternative options that can function at all points in the delivery 
transmission mechanism (ibid.). By nurturing commitments among equals where principals can 
comprise both governmental and non-government actors, collective action can potentially be 
unbundled to create opportunities for islands of effectiveness (ibid.). 
 
MS islands of effectiveness therefore entail collaborative governance that aims to facilitate 
coordination among actors to produce a quasi-rent (a quasi-public-good) with benefits that are 
shared among all participants/beneficiaries (Levy, 2011, p. 7). 
 
There are a number of risks associated with MS arrangements. These include (Levy, 2011, p. 8): 
 Predation, referring to the willingness and ability of actors to override with impunity the rules of 
the game to capture rents for private purposes; 
 Distributive conflicts arising from disagreement over how to share the benefits and/or who will 
lead; 
 ‘Free-riding’ where a participant chooses to shirk on his/her obligations but still share in the 
benefits; and 
 Corruption, where a participant pays (or accepts) a bribe to illegally override an agreed-upon 
formal or informal rule. 
 
To be effective and to mitigate risks, the main characteristics of MS cooperation should include 
(Levy, 2014, pp. 150-155): 
 Strong leadership to mobilise and coordinate stakeholders, clarify the rules governing eligibility 
and foster agreement on the goals to be achieved. 
 A sufficient number of stakeholders with the right political influence and strong incentives for the 
project to succeed. 
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 Effective institutional arrangements and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that all parties are 
clear on and live up to their ends of the bargain. 
 All participants need to regard the operating rules as fair, thereby building trust and social capital. 
 
MS governance should not be conflated with MS initiatives. While both would include multiple 
stakeholders (governmental and/or non-governmental), multi-stakeholder governance (MS), for the 
purpose of this study, refers to scenarios where the governance structure does not depend on normal 
accountability chains and public sector hierarchies. The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa is 
examined in this study as a possible example of results being achieved by MS governed initiatives 
that do not depend on normal bureaucratic accountability chains. 
 
 Public entrepreneurship 
The emergence of islands of effectiveness is often due to what Levy (2014, p.157) describes as 
public or bureaucratic entrepreneurship or “the presence of leadership capable of skilfully mobilising 
and coordinating stakeholders” that depends less on functioning principal-agent relationships and 
more on an ability to convene a critical mass of sufficiently influential stakeholders behind a shared 
objective. 
 
Public or bureaucratic entrepreneurs are “…conceived as judgmental decision-makers who 
experiment with combinations of privately and publicly owned resources in pursuit of social, political, 
cultural, and other public objectives” (Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2010). This takes the 
form of civil activists and public officials committed to achieving developmental results, often in 
opposition to political agents and usually driven by a deep sense of purpose and client orientation, 
rather than personal gain (Levy, 2014, pp. 219-220). 
 
Public entrepreneurs are “motivated by diverse interests including improving services to their own 
communities, sharing the burden for increasing benefits, the stimulus of innovation, the respect they 
receive from others, as well as the income they derive from their positions in the public service for 
those who are not entirely volunteer workers” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 1). 
 
For the purposes of this study, public entrepreneurs are defined as government employees that are 
willing and able to work within complex political settings to overcome institutional constraints to 
deliver public goods and services. The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa is used as a case study 
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 Measuring development and governance 
As stated earlier, development strategies are predominantly occupied with inclusive economic 
growth (reducing poverty and income-inequality), equal opportunities and the equitable distribution 
of socio-economic rewards. 
 
Poverty can be defined as “pronounced deprivation in well-being” and is usually measured in order 
to target appropriate interventions and to evaluate the effectiveness of these interventions. Inequality 
describes the distribution of poverty indicators across the whole population (Haughton & Khandker, 
2009, p. 1).  Measures of poverty and inequality include: 
 Gross National or Domestic Product (GNP or GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita 
are popular measures of overall or average poverty and development. Composite indices such 
as the Human Development Index (HDI) are generally believed to provide more accurate 
representations of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty (Santos & Santos, 2014, p. 134). 
 Inequality can be measured among individuals or households (vertical inequality) or across 
groups of people within a society (horizontal inequality). The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
are popular measures of vertical inequality (Stewart & Samman, 2014, p. 99). 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), published annually by the World Bank for over 200 
countries, supplement the tools available to measure some of the important pre-conditions to 
development (Levy, 2014, pp. 122-123). Although the concepts measured by the WGIs are 
imprecisely defined, they do provide a very useful view of the state of governance in a particular 
country and comparatively across all countries measured (Levy, 2014, pp. 122-123). 
 
While it is unlikely that the impact of Operation Phakisa can be measured using macro-level 
aggregate economic indicators, these indicators as well as the WGI assist in contextualising public 
sector governance in South Africa and the environment in which the Operation Phakisa methodology 
is applied. 
 
 Operation Phakisa 
After visiting Malaysia in August 2013, President Jacob Zuma tasked DPME to investigate the 
application of the Malaysian BFR methodology as a possible approach to improve government policy 
development and implementation in South Africa. DPME subsequently developed a governance 
framework and implementation approach and Cabinet in March 2014 approved the piloting of 
Operation Phakisa, focusing on the oceans economy in South Africa (DPME, 2015b). 
 
To date Operation Phakisa labs were conducted in the following areas (Masilela, T. Personal 
interview, 15 November 2017): 
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 Oceans economy (July to August 2014) 
 Ideal clinics (October to November 2014) 
 ICT in education (September to October 2015) 
 Mining economy (October to November 2015) 
 Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (planned for 2017/18) 
 
Although there are suggestions that the selection of thematic areas was simply based on the 
readiness and willingness of Cabinet Ministers to conduct Operations Phakisa (Akhalwaya, I. 
Personal interview, 14 September 2017), there was consensus that thematic areas should be 
selected based on three broad criteria (Masilela, T. Personal interview, 15 November 2017): 
 Must be a key priority identified in the National Development Plan and must address poverty, 
inequality and unemployment; 
 The focus area must involve multiple stakeholders; and 
 There should be scope for “Big Fast Results”. 
 
The Operation Phakisa approach involves multiple sectors and stakeholders in planning and 
implementation related to complex national development challenges.  These challenges typically 
require unconventional solutions that aim to fast-track implementation through rigorous monitoring 
and issue resolution with a strong emphasis on public accountability (DPME, 2015b). The 
unpublished Operation Phakisa framework compiled by DPME in 2015 (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4), recognised that the Operation Phakisa methodology was extremely resource-intensive 
and that successful implementation required (DPME, 2015b): 
 The establishment and maintenance of functioning governance and implementation structures; 
 Implementing and maintaining management information systems; 
 Regular oversight by the Minister of the lead department; and 
 Intervention by the Presidency to resolve blockages. 
 
The intended methodology of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa, modelled on the Malaysian 
BFR, can be summarised as follows (Akhalwaya, 2015): 
 Key stakeholders from the public and private sectors, academia and civil society organisations 
are brought together in sessions (labs) to collaborate in detailed problem analysis, clear 
intervention planning, priority setting and resource allocation, and designing implementation 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 The results of the labs are detailed (also called 3-feet) plans with clear targets (KPIs) and 
commitments on implementation by all stakeholders. The 3-feet-plan concept denotes operational 
plans at implementation level (close to the ground), as opposed to strategic or 10,000-feet plans. 
 Implementation is rigorously monitored against each KPI and results are audited and reported on 
publically. 
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 Implementation challenges are effectively managed and addressed. 
 
The original Operation Phakisa methodology relied less on normal public sector accountability chains 
and incorporated most of the elements of recursive or incremental approaches discussed earlier.   
 
 Analytical framework summary 
Authors such as Levy (2014), Butler (2010), Bond and Hulme (1999) and Andrews (2013) agree that 
there is no holy grail or blueprint that fits all and that effective delivery transmission mechanisms 
leading to real development are invariably linked to the ability of states to consider the nature of their 
political settlements and institutional complexity in developing and implementing policies. Finding a 
good fit as described by Levy (2014, pp. 155-158), both at a macro country level and within a 
particular sector, depends on the interaction between these two key determinants. 
 
Table 2-2 summarises for each quadrant the likelihood of where normal bureaucratic transmission 
mechanisms dependent on hierarchical accountability chains (Weberian or NPM) and MS or PS 
arrangements will work. The table focusses on three possible delivery transmission mechanisms: 
 NPM: Normal bureaucratic mechanisms based on the broad principles of New Public 
Management that depend on functioning accountability chains involving multiple principal-agent 
relationships (both long and short routes to accountability). 
 PE Islands: Smaller sector or issue-specific islands of effectiveness governed by the broad 
principles of NPM that depend on shorter, less complex principal-agent 
relationships/accountability chains. 
 MS Islands: Multi-stakeholder governed islands of effectiveness that do not depend on 
hierarchical and/or bureaucratic accountability chains. 
 
An important distinction between PE and MS islands is that public entrepreneurs could emerge to fill 
gaps in accountability chains while multi-stakeholder governance arrangements are usually 
deliberately designed to avoid complex accountability chains. 
 
Table 2-2: Good fit matrix 
  Organisational / institutional complexity 



















NPM: Can work, depends on issue 
PE Islands: Can work, depends on 
issue 
MS islands: Likely to work 
NPM: Likely to work 
PE Islands: Likely to work 
MS islands: Likely to work 
Competitive 
(Contested) 
NPM: Unlikely to work 
PE Islands: Possible if narrow (no 
competing hierarchies) – short route 
MS islands: Can work but difficult to 
implement 
NPM: Can work, depends on complexity 
PE Islands: Likely to work – depends 
on complexity and competing 
hierarchies 
MS islands: Likely to work 
Adapted from Levy (2014) 
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Table 2-3 summarises the main characteristics and drivers of NPM, PE and MS delivery 
mechanisms. The summary focusses on the following key elements: 
 Broader and issue-specific context: 
o Impact of political settlement/consensus on the problem, solution, priorities: How consensus 
on the what and the how is reached and the impact of broader political context. 
o Impact of institutions/rules of the game: The impact of institutional context on what can be done 
and how it should be done. 
 Governance: 
o Structure and leadership: The structure of principal/agent relationships and accountability 
chains, the importance and source of leadership and how authority is derived and exercised. 
o How stakeholders/participants are involved: How the players in the game are chosen. 
o Predation / Free-riding / Corruption risks: The risks of predation, corruption and free-riding 
(inherent risk) and how this can be mitigated (residual risk). 
o Monitoring and sanctions. Meeting targets versus achieving impact: This is an important 
indicator of isomorphic mimicry – doing for the sake of doing, or for the sake of results. 
 Enablers: 
o Funding: Reliance on funding increases complexity. Reliance on public funding could impact 
project/activities that do not enjoy high-level political support. Less reliance on public funding 
could reduce the risks of predation and corruption. 
o Public sector capacity: Reliance on public sector capacity to achieve objectives. 
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Table 2-3: Comparing NPM, PE and MS delivery mechanisms 






Broader and issue-specific context 





High. Vulnerable to political 
predation. Difficult to de-
politicise issues. Involves 
principals and agents that 
are not equal in authority 
and influence. Dependant 
on leadership and clarity of 
task. 
Moderate. Complex 
process involving political 
principals and other 
stakeholders. Must work 
within political settlement 
but can expand or 
supplement through 
innovation. 
Low. Based on shared 
incentives and distance 
from political influence. 
Can de-politicise issue. 
Less complex process due 










High. Can change by 
consensus or decree. 
Easier to change broader 
rules of the game if 
required, depends on 
nature of the political 
settlement. 
High to moderate. Has to 
operate within broader 
policy environment. Can 
overcome institutional 
challenges. Focus more on 
the how than the what. 
Depends on conviction and 
ability to sell ideas. 
Low dependence on 
external institutions. 
Difficult to change broader 
rules of the game if 
stakeholders not influential 
enough. Self-imposed rules 
based on consensus more 





Hierarchical. Long route to 
accountability. Increases 
complexity in decision-
making and dispute 
resolution – especially 
across multiple hierarchies. 
Hierarchical. Long and 
short route to 
accountability. Own 
leadership important to 
convince stakeholders of 
the benefits of actions. 
Flat. Shared incentive / 
short route to 
accountability. Leadership 
from within collective/ 
stakeholders who are 
skilful at mobilising to bring 





Political decision with some 
degree of flexibility on 
inclusion as the process 
unfolds. Lack of private 
sector trust can limit scope. 
Initiative of individual(s). 
Complex process of 
building trust of both public 
and private sector partners. 
Must be able to convince 
agents and clients of 
benefits. 
Include only those with a 
direct interest in the issue, 
incentivised by potential 
higher joint benefit for all. 
Easier to build trust with 
private sector partners. 
Residual risk of 
Predation / Free-
riding / Corruption. 
High. Inherent to the 
political/institutional 
landscape. Significant risk 
due to closeness to 
political settlement. 
Patrimonial/predation risk 
higher. Risk of free-riders 
lower.  
High to Moderate. Risk of 
free-riders lower. Needs to 
mitigate risks of predation 
and corruption by involving 
the right stakeholders. 
Inherent risk depends on 
the focus area. 
Moderate to low: Risk of 
free-riders higher. 
Mitigation by ensuring 
stakeholders are well-
connected politically and/or 
stakeholders are able to 
draw on widely held social 







process. Depends on 
leadership/authority and 
ability to sanction. Risk of 
meeting all targets but not 
achieving impact. 
Subject to hierarchical 
monitoring but with some 
freedom to innovate. 
Narrower focus on specific 
targets. Works when 
impact is the incentive. 
Based on consensus and 
built into the rules of the 
game. Impact is the 
incentive 
Enablers 
Funding. Dependent or normal 
government funding 
models. 
Unlikely to function without 
government funding. 
Funding easier if 
consensus on priorities. PE 
must be able to mobilise 
funds if required. 
Can function without 
government funding. 
Funding based on 
expected returns and not 
on priority. 
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Impact of public 
sector capacity. 
High: Inherent involvement 
of public sector hierarchy 
emphasises the 
importance of capacity.  
High to moderate: Can 
overcome constraints by 
involving the right 
stakeholders. 




This framework as summarised in Table 2-4 will be applied further on in the study to the design 
phase (up to and including initial labs) and the implementation phase (post-labs) of the Oceans 
Economy Operation Phakisa.  The purpose of the analysis will be to determine: 
 The major constraints identified (or ignored) during design and implementation. 
 Whether MS islands were used and/or whether PE islands emerged to overcome constraints. 
 
Table 2-4: Analytical framework 
Element Design Implementation 
Context To what extent did the original design 
consider the broader and issue-specific 
contexts? Did the design attempt to 
overcome any context related constraints? 
Did any context related issues emerge 
during implementation that were not 
considered during the design phase? How 
were these addressed (if addressed at all)? 
Governance How did the original design consider 
governance arrangements? Were context 
related and other constraints considered and 
addressed during design?  
Did governance arrangements enable or 
constrain implementation? Did governance 
arrangements evolve during 
implementation to overcome constraints? 
Enablers Did the design consider the role of enablers 
and plans to overcome constraints?  
Did implementation overcome enabler-
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In this Chapter, the political and institutional context in South Africa is described by tracing post-1994 
political and institutional developments and by analysing relevant economic data and other key 
development indicators.  A similar analysis of Malaysia is used to draw a high-level comparison 
between South Africa and Malaysia to determine whether the direct application of the Malaysian 
BFR methodology would have been appropriate in the South African context.  
 
The analysis reveals an increasingly contested political settlement and personalisation of institutions 
in South Africa. Malaysia, on the other hand, is cited as an example where political settlements and 
institutional arrangements did not appear to constrain development.  
 
The chapter concludes by applying the good-fit matrix described in Chapter 2 to both South Africa 
and Malaysia to test the predictive value of the good fit matrix. Hypothesis A1 is then tested, using 
the good-fit matrix as well as relevant economic and other development indicators. 
 
 South Africa: Finding the right model 
3.1.1. Early attempts at defining the developmental agenda 
Prior to the April 1994 general elections in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) agreed 
to adopt the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ (COSATU) Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), essentially a labour driven development programme, as a basis for socio-
economic transformation (Visser, 2004, p. 6). The newly elected government in 1994 recognised 
that growing the economy and addressing high levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment 
required a developmental state that was socially inclusive and had the capacity to deliver (Edigheji, 
2010). 
 
The November 1994 white paper on reconstruction and development however departed significantly 
from the original RDP document. A new commitment to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance 
left little room for implementing the more redistributive elements of the RDP. Implementation of the 
RDP was overseen by the RDP Office established in the Presidency, led by Minister Jay Naidoo, 
former General Secretary of COSATU (Visser, 2004, p. 7) 
 
In 1996 government announced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) 
(Visser, 2004, p. 8). GEAR envisaged a much larger role for the private sector and a smaller role for 
government, essentially changing a growth through redistribution to a redistribution through growth 
approach. The RDP Ministry was abolished in March 1996 and the RDP office was transferred to 
the office of then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. (Visser, 2004). 
Chapter 3 
- 24 - 
Despite some successes, GEAR failed to generate sustained economic and employment growth and 
hardly impacted general levels of poverty and inequality. In 2005 President Thabo Mbeki replaced 
GEAR with the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South (AsgiSA). AsgiSA’s primary aim 
was to address poverty by halving unemployment from 28% in 2004 to 14% in 2012 (South African 
History Online, 2014). 
 
3.1.2. Public sector reform: From apartheid to NPM 
Transformation of the public service soon emerged as one of the drivers of creating a developmental 
state in South Africa (Cloete, 2003). The desire to reinvent the post-apartheid state in South Africa 
coincided with pronounced global shifts in thinking about the design of public sector institutions and 
how they support development (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012, p. 4). From the late 1980’s there was a 
growing movement in South Africa away from traditional “public administration” to a more multi-
disciplinary “Development Administration”, culminating in the 1991 Mount Grace Consultation held 
under the auspices of what was called the National Public Administration Initiative (NPAI) (Chipkin 
& Lipietz, 2012, p. 9). The primary focus of the NPAI was to address what was deemed to be a 
serious gap between the existing public service at the time and “… the type of public servant and 
public service ethos required for successful long-term development” (Mc Lennan & FitzGerald, 
1992). 
 
The Public Service Act of 1994 and the Labour Relations Act of 1995, which paved the way for the 
establishment of a public sector coordinating bargaining council (PSCBC) for most parts of the public 
sector, were some of the first important milestones in the public sector reform process (Cameron & 
Naidoo, 2016). This was followed by the appointment of the Presidential Review Commission on the 
transformation of the South African Public Service (partially inspired by the Mount Grace 
Consultation) in 1996 (Cloete, 2003). The Commission completed its work in 1998 and 
recommended significant reforms to improve governance and service delivery in the public service. 
The recommendations of the Commission led to the restructuring of the Presidency and the 
establishment of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) as a think tank for Cabinet 
advice and policy management (Dayal, 2016).  
 
The 1995 white paper on the transformation of the public service (Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA), 1995) sought to contextualise and give effect to the South African 
Government’s commitment to “…institutional transformation and reform as one of the key medium 
and long-term programmes to drive the implementation of the RDP” (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012). The 
white paper envisioned a new public service based on the principles of devolution of power and 
decentralisation (in line with the broad principles of NPM), with a strong focus on the elimination of 
corruption. The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 was a further important milestone in the 
shift from a culture of public bureaucracy to public management (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012). 
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The NPM paradigm in South Africa emphasised the importance of performance measurement as a 
management tool in government. This led to the introduction of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
and evidence-based policy making (EBPM) tools and processes (Rabie & Goldman, 2014).  
 
3.1.3. Introduction of the outcomes approach 
After taking office in 2009, President Jacob Zuma appointed the former Minister of Finance, Mr 
Trevor Manuel, as Minister in the Presidency responsible for planning and Mr Collins Chabane as 
Minister in The Presidency responsible for performance M&E. In 2010 President Zuma replaced 
AsgiSA with the New Growth Path (NGP). The aim of the NGP was to accelerate growth in the South 
African economy in order to rapidly reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality (South African 
History Online, 2014). 
 
The National Planning Commission (NPC), comprising 24 part-time commissioners, was established 
in May 2010 to develop a long-term vision and strategic plan for South Africa to give effect to the 
NGP (NPC, 2017). The main objective of the Commission was to develop a common set of objectives 
and priorities to drive development over the longer-term (NPC, 2017). A secretariat and support 
structures for the Commission was set up as a separate Branch in the Presidency and reported 
directly to Minister Manuel. 
 
The Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) was established in 2010 as a 
stand-alone government department, reporting to Minister Chabane in the Presidency. The 
conceptual framework informing the establishment and mandate of DPME was published in 2009 
(The Presidency, 2009). In essence, the main objective of DPME was to give effect to the 
government-wide M&E policy, adopted by Cabinet in 2005, with a new focus on M&E as a 
mechanism to improve service delivery (Dayal, 2016). The initial mandate of DPME was to: 
 Develop and implement an outcomes approach (with a strong focus on NPM principles and a 
culture of results-based management) to government planning and implementation (similar in 
approach to the Malaysian Government Transformation Programme). 
 Develop, implement and monitor performance agreements between the President and 
government ministers for each of the 12 priority outcomes identified by government. 
 Develop and monitor implementation of delivery agreements between Ministers and key 
stakeholders (mostly other Ministers and Directors General of government departments) for each 
of the 12 priority outcomes. 
 
The 12 priority outcomes identified in 2010 were (DPME, 2014): 
 Quality basic education; 
 A long and healthy life for all South Africans; 
 All people in South Africa are and feel safe; 
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 Decent employment through inclusive growth; 
 A skilled and capable workforce to support an inclusive growth path; 
 An efficient, competitive and responsive economic infrastructure network; 
 Vibrant, equitable, sustainable rural communities contributing towards food security for all; 
 Sustainable human settlements and improved quality of household life; 
 Responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local government; 
 Protect and enhance our environmental assets and natural resources; 
 Create a better South Africa and contribute to a better Africa and a better world; and 
 An efficient, effective and development-oriented public service. 
 
The National Development Plan: Vision 2030 (NDP) developed by the NPC set a number of targets 
to address poverty and inequality in South Africa by 2030 (NPC, 2012): 
 Eliminate income poverty: Reduce the proportion of households with a monthly income below 
R419 per person (in 2009 prices) from 39% to zero. 
 Reduce income inequality: The Gini coefficient should fall from 0.69 to 0.60. 
 The share of income of the bottom 40% of income earners should increase from 6% to 10%. 
 Poverty-induced hunger should be reduced to 0%. 
 
After Cabinet adopted the NDP in 2012, it became necessary to translate the NDP into more concrete 
medium-term indicators and targets. The Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014-2019, 
developed under the guidance of DPME, was adopted by the government in 2014 (DPME, 2014). 
The aim of the MTSF was to ensure policy coherence, alignment and coordination across 
government plans and activities and to ensure that government resources are allocated in support 
of this process. The MTSF also added two additional priority outcomes (DPME, 2014): 
 A comprehensive, responsive and sustainable social protection system; and 
 A diverse, socially cohesive society with a common national identity. 
 
The name of DPME changed to Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with the merger 
of the Planning Branch in the Presidency and DPME in 2014. At the same time, Minister Jeff Radebe 
was appointed Minister in the Presidency responsible for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. There 
has been a significant change in the mandate of DPME since its inception in 2010 which, in addition 
to monitoring and facilitating achievement of the 14 priority outcomes, now also include (DPME, 
2017a): 
 Develop and implement planning frameworks and facilitate the alignment of annual plans and 
budget allocations of all national and provincial departments to NDP priorities; 
 Support socio-economic impact assessments of all legislation and regulations; 
 Support the development and implementation of plans in key sectors, monitor the implementation 
of the MTSF and support intervention strategies where required; 
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 Extensive on the ground frontline service delivery monitoring and managing the Presidential 
Hotline; 
 Monitoring and supporting management performance improvement across all three spheres of 
government; 
 Supporting the national evaluation system and EBPM; 
 Mainstreaming youth development in the work of the department and government; 
 
Apart from developing and monitoring implementation of the 14 priority outcomes through the MTSF, 
one of the early objectives for DPME was to improve state capacity in M&E. Annexure 1 provides an 
example of the current planning/M&E cycle being taught to Directors General and senior managers 
in the public service (Rabie & Goldman, 2014, p. 21). DPME monitors performance against targets 
set for each of the 14 outcomes in the MTSF and consolidated data is published online on the 
Programme of Action (PoA) website (www.poa.gov.za).  These are examples of the extent to which 
NPM principles are continuously being entrenched in the South African bureaucracy. 
 
3.1.4. A state of capture and institutional context 
A significant challenge in South Africa is the extent to which state institutions have been captured 
for party-political purposes through the ruling party’s system of cadre deployment. Kopecký (2011), 
developed an index of party patronage where he rated institutions in different policy sectors on a 
scale of zero (no party-political appointments) to one (complete capture at all levels of hierarchy). 
He found that South Africa rated 0.39 overall with the judiciary (0.19) being the least affected by 
patronage and the military/police (0.56) being the most affected. In another study, Mamogale (2015) 
concluded that the performance of many state institutions in South Africa is regressing due to a lack 
of capacity and a lack of consequences for poor performance. 
 
The “State of Capture” report by the Public Protector (2016) as well as the report “Betrayal of the 
Promise” (Bhorat, Chipkin, Buthelezi, Duma, et al., 2017) provide further strong evidence that 
institutional arrangements in South Africa are becoming more personalised and that the rules and 
monitoring and enforcement arrangements that exist in theory, are less prominent in reality. 
 
Van Vuuren (2017) details the former apartheid government’s sanctions-busting machinery and the 
significant and corrupt involvement of both politicians and the private sector in what essentially 
amounted to a captured state as well. Revelations by the Public Protector and by Bhorat et al. 
support the view by North (1990, p. vii) that our institutions are invariably connected to our history 
and that what we see playing out in South Africa today is the product, not only of the current 
government, but of a long history of abusing state power to achieve nefarious objectives. 
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Von Holdt (2010) paints a stark picture of levels of institutional failure and dysfunctionality in South 
Africa, suggesting that transformation of government institutions post-apartheid has not been 
successful. Du Toit (2012, p. 3) summarises the South African institutional context as follows: “… in 
the context of South Africa, where the state is weak and vulnerable, where a commitment to 
Weberian, technocratic efficiency and meritocracy exists alongside and in contradiction with a 
powerful and important nationalist project within the state (Von Holdt 2010), and where public 
servants with an interest in and a capacity for engaging with social science and research are few 
and far between.” 
 
The extent of state capture in South Africa suggests that rents are more likely to be allocated in a 
discretionary manner, rather than accessed on the basis of initiative and talent (Levy, 2014, p. 23). 
Fukuyama (2014, p. 26) describes this as a state of “neopatrimonialism” where political leaders 
outwardly prescribe to democratic systems and processes and the rule-of-law, but in reality rule 
primarily for private gain. 
 
 The Malaysian model: Brief history 
3.2.1. History 
The Federation of Malaysia has since independence been governed by a relatively stable political 
coalition (Barisan Nasional or National Front), incorporating representatives from diverse ethnical 
and racial groups (Naguib & Smucker, 2009, pp. 102-106). Successive Malaysian governments were 
determined to eradicate poverty and broaden participation in the economy through several 
successive five-year plans. 
 
Malaysian experiments in public sector reform, underpinned by performance management systems 
date back to the programme and performance budgeting system introduced in 1968 (Siddiquee, 
2014a, p. 273) and covered virtually all aspects of the public service and its management (Siddiquee, 
2014b, p. 12). Prior to 2009, the impact of various reforms on public service performance was 
relatively modest, mainly due to gaps between policy and implementation (Siddiquee, 2014a). 
 
3.2.2. Government Transformation Programme 
Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak came to power in 2008 following the resignation of the previous 
Prime Minister after the coalition’s worst electoral performance since independence. In order to 
reverse waning public confidence, the Prime Minister announced a new policy agenda, which led to 
the introduction of the Government Transformation Programme (GTP) in 2009 as a strategy to 
radically transform the Malaysian government (Siddiquee, 2014b, p. 15). The introduction of the GTP 
was primarily informed by opinion polls, successes of earlier efforts to transform government-linked 
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enterprises through performance-based targets and the introduction of the Performance 
Management and Delivery Unit in the United Kingdom (Xavier, Siddiquee, & Mohamed, 2016, p. 84). 
The Malaysian Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) was created in 2009 to 
implement the GTP and Dato’ Sri Idris Jala, former head of state-owned Malaysian Airlines with a 
record of turning around struggling business units, was appointed to head PEMANDU (Sabel & 
Jordan, 2015, p. 17). PEMANDU enjoyed flexibility in resource allocation and operations and, unlike 
the rest of the public service, paid its employees performance bonuses (Xavier et al., 2016, pp. 81-
84). 
 
The GTP intended to reform government service delivery by focusing government efforts on 
improving performance across seven national key result areas (NKRAs): crime; corruption; 
education; rural infrastructure; urban public transport; poverty; and cost of living (Xavier et al., 2016, 
p. 81). The NKRAs were a combination of short-term plans to address immediate priorities as well 
as medium and long-term plans to address challenges that required ongoing governmental 
intervention (Siddiquee, 2014b, p. 15). 
 
3.2.3. Big, Fast Results 
An important element of the GTP was the convening of “labs” for each NKRA. Labs brought together 
a wide range of government and private sector stakeholders full-time for up to two months to 
collectively develop action plans for each NKRA. Labs were designed to be non-hierarchical, 
anchored by quantitative analysis and focussed on the pursuit of solutions (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, 
p. 18). This BFR methodology involves all relevant public and private stakeholders to disassemble 
a policy initiative into its smallest components, develop detailed “3-feet” plans that are implementable 
and impactful within a short time frame, allocate human and financial resources, determine 
responsibility and accountability and establish clear governance structures (Performance 
Management and Development Unit (PEMANDU), 2016). 
 
The BFR methodology is further guided by the following principles (BFR institute, 2017): 
 Set impossible or stretch targets to force creativity and out-of-the-box solutions; 
 Being focussed and having a clear endgame in mind is crucial; 
 Discipline of action that requires close monitoring, communicating achievements and the 
immediate identification of problematic areas that require intervention; 
 Leadership styles need to adapt to the different stages in a team’s development, with a more 
directive style usually needed at the outset and a more empowering style along the way; 
 Issues need to be identified, understood and resolved collaboratively through negotiation or 
discussion; and 
 Teams should accept what is within their control and the external factors outside of their control. 
Strong values and ethics should be upheld throughout the journey. 
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Annual KPI setting exercises take place from October to December to assess the viability of 
initiatives and to operationalise implementation (PEMANDU, 2016). A lead government Minister 
identified for each of the seven NKRAs is responsible for setting national KPIs and targets. 
Performance metrics are determined by the Prime Minister with the help of PEMANDU and Ministers 
are held accountable by the Prime Minister for their performance against a set of ministerial KPIs 
(Xavier et al., 2016, p. 84). A delivery task force (DTF) formed for each NKRA is chaired by the 
Deputy Prime Minister (initially the PM) and is attended by the lead Minister, other relevant ministers, 
the CEO of PEMANDU and senior civil servants (Siddiquee, 2014b, p. 16). While annual targets are 
revised by mutual consent based on past performance, longer-term targets remain unchanged 
(Xavier et al., 2016). 
 
The BFR process is clearly dependent on relatively uncontested political settlements and mature 
institutions where each round of review and revision is used as input for the next round of 
implementation, therefore allowing for continuous adaptation. This process emphasises the role of 
local actors in incrementally improving initial plans, resembling a “problem-driven, iterative 
adaptation” (PDIA) or recursive approach (Sabel & Jordan, 2015, p. 6).   
 
 Comparing South Africa and Malaysia 
Given that Operation Phakisa is an adaptation of the Malaysian BFR methodology, it is useful to 
compare South African and Malaysian contexts to consider whether the direct application of the BFR 
methodology in South Africa would have been appropriate. Table 3-1 highlights some of the key 
differences and similarities between the approaches followed in the two countries. 
 
Table 3-1: South Africa and Malaysia: Comparing the broader political and institutional contexts 
Malaysia South Africa 
Political alliances formed based on a desire to 
ensure political inclusivity, stability and equitable 
development. 
Political alliance with strong focus on labour rights 
rather than job creation, productivity or inclusivity. 
Same political alliance in power for a significant 
period of time – suggests political stability and a 
more dominant political settlement. 
Same political alliance in power for a significant 
period of time – suggests political stability and a 
more dominant political settlement. 
Developmental agenda has been guided by 
successive and complementary five-year plans 
since the 1970’s - suggests dominant political 
settlement. 
Developmental agenda has seen several plans, 
each championed by different political principals 
and role-players - suggests contested / competitive 
political settlement. 
7 NKRAs are determined through an inclusive and 
consultative process. GTP enjoyed strong political 
and popular support since its introduction in 2009 – 
suggests dominant political settlement and general 
agreement on institutional arrangements required 
for growth. 
14 Government Outcomes determined by Cabinet. 
The NGP and the outcomes approach are not 
entrenched in government and have not enjoyed 
strong political or popular support. The National 
Development Plan was the first attempt at a more 
inclusive and popular developmental agenda - 
suggests contested political settlement. 
The NTP (GTP and ETP), BFR and other 
government processes are intertwined and share 
governance structures. 
There are no direct governance links between the 
NDP, 14 outcomes and Operation Phakisa. 
Source: Author 
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The South African Outcomes System identified 14 priority areas with implementation oversight 
centralised in the DPME. Detailed public information on progress in these areas is limited and a 
traffic light system originally implemented is no longer available on the PoA website. The website is 
also not user-friendly and performance data for many indicators is not available, is outdated or does 
not relate to the target. Where data is available, it would appear that several targets have not been 
met. To date, there is no evidence to suggest that the performance agreements between the 
President and Ministers are enforced and that non-performing Ministers and Directors General are 
sanctioned or replaced as a result. Analysis of the South African system, in place for a similar time 
period as the GTP, shows little if any evidence of the outcomes approach having a significant impact 
to date on the ultimate objective of achieving a developmental state. 
 
Given the clear differences in approach and context, the direct application of the BFR methodology 
in South Africa would not have been appropriate and it would have been necessary to adapt the 
methodology to the South African context. 
 
 Key development indicators 
3.4.1. Poverty and inequality 
The South African National Development Plan and outcomes system aimed to address a broader 
(and often less specific) set of indicators than the GTP and ETP in Malaysia. Although South Africans 
are less poor (on average) now than in 1994 (Figure 3-1), GNI per capita declined between 2013 
and 2015. 
 
Figure 3-1: SA and Malaysia - GNI and GNI per capita at constant 2010 US$:1990 to 2015 
 
Compiled from: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017b) 
 
Malaysian GNI per capita increased by 145% between 1990 and 2015 while the South African GNI 
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average poverty (despite a slightly higher average population growth rate of 2% compared to 1.8% 
in South Africa). 
 
World Bank estimates show a slight decrease in income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
for Malaysia from 47.6 in the early 1990s to 46.3 by 2010. Income inequality in South Africa increased 
from 59.3 to 63.4 over the same period (World Bank, 2017b). Woolard, Metz, Inchauste, Lustig, 
Maboshe et al. (2015) show that income inequality would have been significantly higher at around 
0.77 had it not been for at the positive impact of South Africa’s progressive social spending policies 
and that levels of poverty and inequality in South Africa remain very high when compared to other in 
middle-income countries. 
 
3.4.2. Multi-dimensional poverty and unemployment 
Multi-dimensional poverty in South Africa declined from 17.9% in 2001 to 7.0% by 2016, mostly as 
a result of high levels of government social spending. In 2015 approximately 30.4 million people in 
South Africa were considered poor (with an income of less than R992 per person), almost half of 
those living in extreme poverty (Statistics South Africa, 2017a). Unemployment in South Africa 
remains at high levels, with 27.7% of active work seekers being unable to find employment and only 
43.2% of the population aged 15 to 64 being employed (Statistics South Africa, 2017b). 
 
3.4.3. Human Development Index 
South Africa’s performance on the HDI (Figure 3-2) shows varying results. Starting from more or less 
the same base in 1990, South African HDI initially declined and only returned to pre-1994 levels by 
2012, while the Malaysian HDI showed consistent improvement over the same period. 
 
Figure 3-2: South Africa and Malaysia – HDI 
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The 2015 HDI ranked South Africa 116th overall, 175th in terms of life expectancy at birth, 79th in 
terms of expected years of schooling, 63rd in terms of mean years of schooling and 87th in terms of 
GNI per capita (UNDP, 2016a). The decline in overall HDI from 1994 can most likely be attributed to 
the reluctance of President Thabo Mbeki’s government to embrace the realities of HIV/Aids and to 
implement appropriate policies, which significantly impacted life expectancy. 
 
3.4.4. Worldwide Governance Indicators and the corruption perception index 
WGI data (Table 3-2) suggests that the overall governance environment in South African 
deteriorated between 1996 and 2016 with government effectiveness and control of corruption 
showing the most significant decline. While WGI data does not prove causality, it would suggest that 
public sector reform (if measured by the government effectiveness indicator) was more successful 
in Malaysia than in South Africa. 
 
Table 3-2: WGI Indicators – Malaysia and South Africa 
Indicator 
Malaysia South Africa 
1996 2016 Change 1996 2016 Change 
Voice and Accountability  -0.18   -0.47   -0.29   0.84   0.64   -0.20  
Political Stability  0.57   0.10   -0.47   -0.38   -0.13   0.25  
Government Effectiveness  0.54   0.88   0.35   1.02   0.27   -0.75  
Regulatory Quality  0.78   0.71   -0.07   0.52   0.21   -0.30  
Rule-of-Law  0.52   0.54   0.01   0.09   0.07   -0.02  
Control of Corruption  0.38   0.11   -0.27   0.73   0.05   -0.68  
Compiled from: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017a) 
 
However, when looking at impact in the area of control of corruption (one of the 7 NKRAs in Malaysia 
and part of Outcome 3 in South Africa) it would appear that neither the Malaysian nor the South 
African models achieved results. While the Transparency International (2016) corruption perception 
index suggests that corruption in South Africa declined marginally from 2012 to 2016, the WGI score 
for corruption declined significantly from 0.73 in 1996 to 0.05 in 2016, indicating that South Africa is 
not winning the battle against corruption. This supports the proposition by Levy (2014) that countries 
on an early stage competitive trajectory are often characterised by high levels of corruption, which 
suggests that institutions are becoming more personalised. 
 
The significance of the WGI data is emphasised by the assertion by Fukuyama (2014, p. 63) that 
there is a high degree of correlation between levels of corruption and government effectiveness, and 
government effectiveness and economic development. This assertion is to some extent disproved 
by Malaysia, where control of corruption decreases but government effectiveness increases. In the 
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3.4.5. Public opinion 
A survey by the Human Sciences Research Council in 2015 found that the top five issues citizens 
were dissatisfied with were (in descending order of degree of dissatisfaction): Unemployment, 
corruption, crime, land reform and affordable housing (Bohler-Muller, Davids, Roberts, Kanyane, et 
al., 2016, p. 8). What is most concerning from this survey is that the prevalence and ranking of these 
issues have hardly changed since the survey was first conducted in 2003. This suggests that the 
many achievements of the post-1994 government in South Africa have not sufficiently addressed 
the primary concerns and needs of citizens. 
 
 The South African development trajectory 
3.5.1. Implications for the South African public sector 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the South African context is characterised by contested 
political settlements and increasingly personalised institutions. When applying the typology 
developed by Levy (2014), South Africa has therefore, in terms of political settlements, moved from 
a dominant to a competitive trajectory. WGI data, as well as several reports cited in this chapter, 
show that the South African institutional context is becoming increasingly personalised and has 
therefore moved from cell 3 (rule-by-law space) to somewhere between cells 2 and 4 (Table 3-3). 
 
Table 3-3: South Africa’s development trajectory 
















Adapted from Levy (2014, p. 16) 
 
Based on the good fit matrix (Table 2-2) it is therefore unlikely that comprehensive public sector 
reform would have been effective at supporting a developmental state in South Africa and that growth 
is more likely to be supported through incremental approaches and the emergence of islands of 
effectiveness as suggested by Levy (2014).  
 
In reality, public sector reform in South Africa succeeded only in addressing previous racial 
imbalances and not in establishing a capable public service. Appointments to senior management 
positions (and sometimes even lower level positions) in the civil service, government entities and 
state-owned enterprises have become increasingly dependent on political affiliation and conformity, 
commonly referred to as cadre deployment. WGI data, Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index, as well as public opinion show that there is no real commitment to reducing 
corruption. The assertion by Fukuyama (2014, p. 30) that countries where democracy preceded 
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modern state-building generally found it more difficult to achieve high-quality governance appears to 
hold true in the case of South Africa. 
 
Development indicators show that the South African Government has not been successful at 
addressing the key challenges of poverty and inequality. While economic indicators do not directly 
attribute this failure to public sector capacity, the evidence provided in this chapter combined with 
the predictive value of the good-fit matrix show that public sector reform based on NPM principles 
was inappropriate given the South African political and institutional context, which refutes Hypothesis 
A1. 
 
3.5.2. Implications for Operation Phakisa 
Refuting Hypothesis A1 implies that scenarios 1 and 2 (Table 3-4) are unlikely and that the design 
and implementation of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa would therefore have to have been 
a deliberate and considered attempt at doing things differently to avoid isomorphic mimicry that 
reinforced rather than escaped capability traps. 
 
Table 3-4 Hypothesis A matrix – first application 
Hypothesis A2 not refuted A2 refuted 
A1 not refuted Scenario 1. Public sector capacity is 
unlikely to be a limiting factor in the 
development and the design and 
implementation of Operation Phakisa were 
appropriate given this context. 
Scenario 2. The effectiveness of 
Operation Phakisa was limited by its own 
design, rather than broader public sector 
capacity. 
A1 refuted Scenario 3. While public sector capacity 
did not create an enabling environment, 
Operation Phakisa was able to overcome 
this limitation through context-appropriate 
design and implementation. 
Scenario 4. The effectiveness of 
Operation Phakisa was limited by both 
broader public sector capacity as well as 
its own design. 
 
Referring back to Table 2-3: Comparing NPM, PE and MS delivery mechanisms and Table 2-4: 
Analytical framework, the refuting of Hypothesis A1 has a number of implications for initiatives such 
as Operation Phakisa.  The main implications, as well as mitigating steps (Table 3-5), constitute key 
elements or criteria that should have been considered during the design and implementation of 
Operation Phakisa. 
 
Table 3-5: Operation Phakisa - key design elements 
Element Implication Mitigation 
Context Accept that political agreement on priorities 
could be difficult and be prepared to 
change the rules of the game. 
 Make it clear who is in charge. 
 Change the rules of the game. 
Governance Accept that the long road to accountability 
is unlikely to work and that multiple 
stakeholders need to work together to get 
things done. 
 Involve and empower the right stakeholders. 
 Implement effective governance structures 
that can coordinate implementation, monitor 
progress and address blockages. 
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Element Implication Mitigation 
Enablers Accept that public sector capacity is limited 
and that dedicated funding will be required 
to implement. 
 Ring-fence funding. 




The analytical framework (Table 2-4) and key design elements (Table 3-5) will be applied in Chapter 
4 - analysis of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa - to test Hypothesis A2 in order to determine 
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This chapter reviews the first implementation of the Operation Phakisa methodology and how the 
South African Government intended for this methodology to improve the impact of the oceans 
economy. The analysis of the design, implementation and effectiveness of the Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa focusses on three specifics points in time: 
 The original labs conducted in 2014, to see how the intended design evolved during 
implementation; 
 The 2015 review workshop that highlighted key short-comings in the design and implementation 
of Operation Phakisa; and 
 A detailed review of June 2017 progress report data to establish effectiveness, whether plans 
were amended and the reasons for the amendment. 
 
This chapter draws on monitoring data and reports and on personal interviews with key participants 
in the Operation Phakisa governance structures, including: 
 Mr Ismail Akhalwaya, Head of the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit until October 2015 and 
responsible for the initial adaptation and implementation of BFR methodology in South Africa. 
 Mr Thulani Masilela, Acting Deputy Director General (DPME), former acting head of the DPME 
Operations Phakisa Unit and co-chair of the Oceans Economy Labs Coordinating Committee. 
 Mr Charles Goodwin, senior manager in the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit responsible for 
monitoring systems and part of the original Operation Phakisa implementation team. 
 Mr Mpumzi Bonga, former Head of the Oil and Gas Delivery Unit and Head of the Operation 
Phakisa Unit at DPME since November 2017.  
 
The chapter concludes with a brief comparison between the Malaysian BFR model and Operation 
Phakisa. This is followed by a summary of findings and an assessment of the Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa to determine whether results could be attributed to normal bureaucratic 
processes and/or islands of effectiveness. This analysis is then used to: 
 test Hypothesis A2 to determine whether the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa designed and 
implemented appropriate and effective institutions and delivery transmission mechanisms; and 
 test Hypotheses B1 and B2 to determine whether the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa 
resulted in the emergence of islands of effectiveness. 
 
 How the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa unfolded 
4.1.1. The oceans economy as a key driver of development 
Chapter 4 of the National Development Plan (NDP) notes the large potential but also the weak 
capacity of South African maritime industries (NPC, 2012). Unlocking this potential cannot be 
Chapter 4 
- 38 - 
achieved by government or the private sector alone, and would therefore require substantial public 
and private investment and effective and efficient public-private partnerships (Walker, 2014). Based 
on this assertion as well as the objectives of Operation Phakisa outlined in Chapter 2 one would 
expect to find deliberate attempts at involving and empowering non-governmental stakeholders in 
the Phakisa process. 
 
The aim of the Oceans Economy Labs was to stimulate economic development and wealth creation 
by leveraging South Africa’s significant and largely untapped maritime resources (Walker, 2014). 
The labs, conducted from 8 July to 14 August 2014 in Durban, produced detailed plans in four 
maritime focus areas: aquaculture; marine transport and manufacturing (MTM); offshore oil and gas 
exploration (O&G); and marine protection and governance (MPG). It was projected that the oceans 
economy could add up to R177 billion per year to the South African GDP and between 800,000 and 
1,000,000 direct jobs by 2033 (Kings, 2016). This represents a significant increase over the current 
estimated R54 billion and 316 000 jobs in the sector. 
 
4.1.2. Original governance model 
According to Akhalwaya (2015), the original governance model envisaged for the Oceans Economy 
Operation Phakisa (Annexure 2) was largely based on the Malaysian BFR model. This model 
evolved over time and by 2015 consisted of multiple layers of responsibility and accountability 
(Annexure 3). The purpose and role of each of the implementation and governance structures can 
be summarised as follows (DPME, 2015b): 
 
 Phakisa Implementing Agents (PIAs), Work Groups and Initiative Owners. Multi-stakeholder 
implementing agents are identified and syndicated during the lab and can consist of private and/or 
public sector participants. The PIAs are organised into Work Groups focusing on the 
implementation of specific initiatives within a focus area. Each Working Group is chaired by an 
initiative owner and reports to Delivery Units in lead departments. While responsibility for the 
implementation of specific lab initiatives is transferred to initiative owners, the Delivery Unit and 
the department it represents remain accountable for delivery. 
 
 A Delivery Unit (DU) for each focus area is established (ideally during labs) in the department 
leading the implementation of a focus area. DUs should be capacitated with dedicated resources 
identified during the lab process and should be chaired by a senior public servant, usually from 
the lead department. Each DU has the responsibility to prepare for implementation, oversee 
delivery and issue management/escalation processes and to report on progress. 
 
 The Steering Committee for each focus area, led by the Minister of the lead department, is an 
inter-departmental and -agency structure, bringing together the ministries that were assigned 
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coordination responsibilities for focus areas. This structure drives delivery and manages the issue 
resolution and escalation process for initiatives and activities. Participants in this structure are the 
DPME Phakisa Unit, DU, representatives from PIAs and the Minister and Director General of the 
lead department. 
 
 The Lab Secretariat, working closely with the Phakisa Unit in DPME, is the focal point for lab-
wide, cross-cutting content issues and supports the Phakisa Unit in progress reporting to the 
OPSMC, analysis of aggregated reports for issue resolution by the OPSMC and for providing 
support to individual DUs on specific issues. 
 
 Lab Coordinating Committee (LCC). Monthly meeting co-chaired by the Director General of 
DPME and the Director General of the lead department and attended by Directors General and 
representatives of focus area lead departments. The LCC should resolve delivery challenges that 
affect multiple focus areas that could not be resolved within a specific focus area, or should 
escalate these to the OPSMC. 
 
 The Operation Phakisa Sector Ministerial Committee (OPSMC) or Inter-Ministerial Committee 
(IMC), co-chaired by the Minister in the Presidency and the Minister of the lead department and 
attended by Ministers of other relevant departments, is responsible for driving, monitoring and 
reporting on delivery progress, resolving delivery issues and communication among governance 
structures and role-players. Unresolved issues are escalated to the PIRC. 
 
 Presidential Issue Resolution Committee (PIRC). Chaired by the Minister in the Presidency and 
attended by the Minister of Finance and other relevant Ministers. This committee represents the 
final layer of decision-making within Operation Phakisa and should meet twice per year to resolve 
issues that could not be resolved by the OPSMC. 
 
 The Phakisa Unit established within DPME supports all the structures of Operation Phakisa in 
terms of establishing and developing the necessary governance, communication and risk plans 
as well as developing and maintaining the Operation Phakisa Monitoring System (OPMS). The 
Phakisa Unit is ultimately responsible for the efficient and effective functioning of decision-making 
structures and the monitoring of delivery of Operation Phakisa activities, outputs and outcomes 
(DPME, 2015b). 
 
The Operation Phakisa framework document was never formally approved by DPME Management 
or Cabinet. Terms of reference documents developed for each of the governance structures were 
also never formally approved and published (Akhalwaya, I. Personal interview, 14 September 2017). 
This was primarily because these documents were intended as guidelines only and each Operation 
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Phakisa was expected to design its own appropriate governance structures (Masilela, T. Personal 
interview, 15 November 2017). 
 
4.1.3. Initial laboratories 
This section focusses on the initial labs conducted in 2014 in order to see how the intended design 
and the roles of different stakeholders in the process, evolved during implementation. The final lab 
reports produced by each of the four focus areas are summarised and analysed at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
The Oceans Economy Labs brought together 656 participants from government and the private 
sector as well as 30 coordinators and facilitators. Labs were facilitated by PEMANDU and McKinsey 
& Company (a global management consulting firm). The President, 17 Ministers and 17 Directors 
General visited the labs and participated in syndication sessions (Akhalwaya, 2015). The primary 
role-players in the Oceans Economy Labs were: 
 The President, being the overall project sponsor; 
 Mr Jeff Radebe, Minister in the Presidency responsible for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; 
and 
 Ms Edna Molewa, Minister for Environmental Affairs. 
 
Although the original intention was for Ministers Radebe and Molewa to co-chair the OPSMC, 
President Zuma in his speech when launching the ICT in Education Operation Phakisa in October 
2015, clarified that Minister Radebe and DPME were responsible for the overall management of the 
Phakisa methodology and the M&E of the implementation thereof and that the relevant lead Minister 
(Minister Molewa in this case) was responsible for convening partner departments (Masilela, T. 
Personal interview, 15 November 2017). 
 
The initial laboratories succeeded in the objective of bringing together multiple stakeholders from 
both government (departments, agencies and state-owned enterprises) and the private sector. While 
participation in the original labs was by invitation only, there was no restriction on participation and 
all relevant non-governmental stakeholders were encouraged to participate. The lack of participation 
of some stakeholders could be attributed to a lack of resources (smaller organisations found it difficult 
to commit personnel for the 6-week lab period) as well as some element of mistrust of government 
processes (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). While several non-governmental 
stakeholders were involved in the initial labs, these stakeholders were not required to lead any of 
the initiatives (Masilela, T. Personal interview, 15 November 2017). 
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Summaries of the outcomes of the initial labs are contained in the tables at the end of this chapter 
and are, unless otherwise indicated, based on the lab reports published on the Operation Phakisa 
website (www.operationphakisa.gov.za). 
 
4.1.4. October 2015 review workshop 
This section focusses on the main themes emerging from the 2015 review workshop, not on detailed 
progress reports. The 2015 review workshop was the first opportunity to bring together participants 
from the original labs as well as those that subsequently joined the process to highlight and discuss 
cross-cutting issues related to design and implementation (Akhalwaya, I. Personal interview, 14 
September 2017). This was therefore an important learning moment and provided an ideal 
opportunity to improve delivery transmission mechanisms. 
 
On 15 October 2015, the first Operation Phakisa: Oceans Economy Review Workshop took place in 
Cape Town. The objectives of the review workshop were to (DPME, 2015a): 
 Share an honest representation of progress of the focus areas and cross-cutting issues; 
 Identify key constraints and opportunities to accelerate impact and propose specific actions; 
 Assess the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and identify opportunities for improvement; 
and 
 Renew sectors’ commitment to move forward together. 
 
Summaries of the outcomes of the review workshops are unless otherwise indicated, based on 
reports published on the Operation Phakisa website (www.operationphakisa.gov.za). 
 
The summary report presented at the workshop focussed on five cross-cutting themes that would 
require leadership intervention to expedite progress of the Oceans Economy Phakisa. These 
themes, and associated recommendations, included (DPME, 2015a): 
 Speed up policy decisions: Progress in several focus areas was held up due to slow policy 
development and/or Ministerial decision-making. 
 Deepen leadership involvement: In some cases, the inter-departmental collaboration required 
to implement plans was lacking and strong leadership was needed to proactively address 
challenges and coordinate the implementation of solutions. 
 Secure effective institutional arrangements: Some progress was made in setting up Operation 
Phakisa DUs but there was a need for substantial and urgent improvement in this area. 
Institutional arrangements needed to become operational with urgency, including Steering 
Committee meetings, appropriate capacity and funding for Operation Phakisa, and dedicated 
resources for the DUs. 
 Strengthen communications and transparency: All working groups raised concerns regarding 
the lack of sufficient communication to different groups of stakeholders (including the private 
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sector and the public). It was recommended that stakeholder engagement processes had to be 
enhanced through a coordinated effort between the Operation Phakisa Unit at DPME, the Oceans 
Economy Secretariat and the DUs. 
 Improve access to opportunities: Access to opportunities needed to be improved by creating 
linkages with other African countries and strengthening communication. A further specific 
suggestion was to develop an online platform to better coordinate supply and demand of training 
and of jobs in the focus areas of the oceans economy. 
 
The majority of the issues raised at the review workshop were never addressed, which led to some 
participants in the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa losing interest in the process. A second 
review workshop initially planned for 2016, did not materialise primarily due to the lack of impact of 
the first workshop (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). Progress on various Operations 
Phakisa is however reported to Cabinet on a regular basis (Masilela, T. Personal interview, 15 
November 2017), which seems to have replaced the role originally envisaged for the PIRC. 
 
4.1.5. Detailed review of progress - June 2017 
Detailed progress reports as at 23 June 2017 for each of the four focus areas are included at the 
end of this chapter. Table 4-1 provides a summary of progress in the different focus areas in 
achieving the targets agreed to at the original labs as well as additional / changes to targets that 
emerged subsequently. 
 











Completed on time 
# % # % # % 
Aqua 8 2 026 1 467 72.4% 614 41.9% 301 49.0% 
MPG 7* 327 222 67.9% 178 80.2% 128 71.9% 
MTM 18 349 281 80.5% 29 10.3% 14 48.3% 
O&G 11 388 238 61.3% 232 97.5% 193 83.2% 
TOTAL 44 3 090 2 208 71.5% 1 053 47.7% 636 60.4% 
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017b) 
*Progress is tracked for only seven of the ten initiatives 
 
Summaries of progress are based on dashboard reports (Annexures 4 a - d) obtained from the 
Operation Phakisa website on 23 June 2017 as well as unpublished detailed progress report data 
obtained from the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit (DPME, 2017b). In terms of progress report data, 
the MPG and O&G focus areas were the most successful at achieving targets. 
 
During the period October 2014 until June 2017, the LCC met monthly and the OPSMC met quarterly 
as originally planned, but the PIRC never met. The LCC was usually chaired by the Acting Head of 
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the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit, Mr Thulani Masilela and the Head of the Lab Secretariat, Mr 
Andre Share, not the Directors General of DPME and the lead department as originally envisaged 
(Goodwin, C. Personal interview, July 2017). 
 
President Zuma monitors progress on achieving the 14 government outcomes on a quarterly basis 
during what is called “PoA reporting weeks”. The PIRC therefore never materialised as cross-cutting 
issues were dealt with during Cabinet meetings and during quarterly PoA reporting weeks (Masilela, 
T. Personal interview, 15 November 2017). 
 
 High-level assessment 
There is anecdotal evidence that focus areas and specific activities have been selected through a 
political rather than a rational or evidence-based process, with economic benefits accruing to 
selected actors possibly being more important than the relevance of the focus areas. While this may 
not limit experiential learning, it could impact on the relevance of achievements. 
 
There also appears to be a disconnect between the Presidency (who has seen the role of the 
President in the Operation Phakisa process to be largely ceremonial) and DPME (Akhalwaya, I. 
Personal interview, 14 September 2017). This is likely to be the result of a broader process of 
separating the Presidency and DPME (which was originally intended to be a department in the 
Presidency). 
 
The respective roles of the DPME Phakisa Unit and the lead department were also not clearly defined 
(Akhalwaya, I. Personal interview, 14 September 2017). The first Head of the DPME Phakisa Unit 
was redeployed in October 2015. While an acting head was appointed, the unit has not been 
functioning optimally since inception. A new permanent head of the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit 
was only appointed in November 2017. 
 
Unlike the Malaysian BFR model (described in Chapter 2) which is used in the setting of annual 
targets across all NKRAs, Operation Phakisa focusses on specific thematic areas. Table 4-2 
summarises the main differences in approach between the Malaysian BFR model and the first 
iteration of Operation Phakisa in South Africa. 
 
Table 4-2: BFR and Phakisa: Differences and similarities in approach 
Malaysia South Africa 
The BFR methodology is used to determine focus 
areas and indicators related to NKRAs. 
The Operation Phakisa methodology is used to 
develop detailed plans in specific thematic areas 
determined by Cabinet. 
Labs used to assess the vitality of initiatives and to 
develop detailed plans. 
Initiatives are a given and labs are only used to 
develop detailed plans. 
Annual labs for all initiatives. Labs are conducted at the beginning only. 
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Malaysia South Africa 
The head of PEMANDU and the Prime Minister 
play a central role in planning and implementation. 
While the President champions Operation Phakisa 
processes, there is no clear leader in the 
management of the process. 
Involves stakeholders from government and the 
private sector, but no clear evidence of multi-
stakeholder governed processes 
Involves stakeholders from government and the 
private sector, but no multi-stakeholder governed 
processes 
Targets are reviewed and amended by mutual 
consent, subject to high-level approval. 
Targets are amended primarily to extend deadlines 
due to inability to unblock bottlenecks. 
PEMANDU and NKRAs have a dedicated budget. Outcomes and Phakisa projects are funded from 
departments’ normal budgets. 
Transparent and open by design. Transparent and open by design, but performance 
data on website is limited*. 
DTF established for each NKRA chaired by deputy 
PM. 
DUs led by senior government employees are 
generally under-staffed  
PM or Deputy PM heads apex decision-making and 
conflict resolution structure. 
Minister in the Presidency and lead Minister heads 
apex structure. No clear leader with uncontested 
authority. 
*The Operation Phakisa website contains limited information on only three of the labs conducted to date. 
 
The fundamental difference between the two approaches is that, unlike in Malaysia, the Oceans 
Economy Operation Phakisa was not integrated into the normal government policy-making and 
implementation processes and therefore essentially became an additional task to be performed by 
bureaucrats instead of becoming part of their key daily tasks.  
 
 Aquaculture 
4.3.1. Initial lab 
The Aquaculture lab aimed to grow sector revenue from R0.67bn to R3bn per year and to increase 
jobs in the sector from 2,000 to 15,000. The final lab report identified eight initiatives (Table 4-10) 
with 2,027 activities. Key stakeholders involved in the lab were predominantly government 
departments and agencies and government-funded development finance institutions. Selected 
initiatives can be classified into two broad groups: Group 1 focussed on regulations, skills, funding 
and market development while group 2 focussed on the establishment of new and the expansion of 
existing aquaculture industries (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014a). 
 
Nine projects from initiative 1 as well as initiatives 3, 5 and 7 were identified as priority “quick wins” 
for completion by March 2016 (the detailed labs report set December 2016 as the target date). The 
DU was to be set up at the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) (this would 
have required the creation of nine new posts in the department) and the Steering Committee was to 
be chaired by the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The main participants in the 
Steering Committee would be the Director General of DAFF and the Directors General from DPME, 
Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), Economic Development (EDD), Trade and Industry 
(DTI), Public Works (DPW), Environmental Affairs (DEA) and Science and Technology (DST) 
(Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014a). 
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Five implementing teams were established to oversee aquaculture projects; aquaculture markets; 
aquaculture regulations; aquaculture funding and aquaculture capacity building. Implementation 
teams were to meet monthly and report progress to the Secretariat (DU). The suggested participants 
in the implementing teams included mostly government departments and agencies and did not 
identify specific industry/private sectors stakeholders. The Steering Committee was intended to meet 
bi-annually to ensure that all aquaculture activities were coordinated throughout government 
departments. A Secretariat (intended to meet quarterly) and Technical Committee was established 
to (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014a): 
 Manage all aquaculture activities through joint planning with all implementing teams; 
 Ensure alignment of all aquaculture activities with other government policies; 
 Coordinate resource mobilisation for all aquaculture activities; 
 Monitor progress of all outcomes; and 
 Provide technical support to implementing teams. 
 
Initiative one relied extensively on external stakeholders, the remainder of the initiatives relied 
primarily on government departments and agencies. 
 
4.3.2. Review workshop 
The review workshop gathered over 40 participants from the private and public sectors. The review 
workshop identified the following areas negatively impacting on delivery (Operation Phakisa 
Documents, 2015a): 
 Lack of sufficient public and private investment. 
 Compliance with legislation was still a challenge for new and small-scale farmers. 
 Lack of skills in the sector. 
 Performance of support services and inter-departmental collaboration. 
 Blockages not always addressed. 
 Plans were not always clear or detailed enough. 
 DU was only moderately effective. 
 
4.3.3. June 2017 progress 
None of the initiatives due for completion by June 2017 had been completed (see Table 4-11 and 
detailed report: Annexure 4a). Overall performance shows that of the 1,467 targets due by June 
2017, only 614 (41.9%) had been completed. The critical initiative of reforming legislation by 
December 2016, which should be wholly within government control, completed only 48 of 74 
activities and the expected completion date was moved to 2018. There is no evidence of attempts 
to draw in stakeholders such as the major retail groups into the process. By July 2017 aquaculture 
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projects have attracted investment commitments of R106 million from the public sector and R338 
million from the private sector (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2017e). 
 
In terms of progress data, none of the 28 (originally 24) aquaculture projects (initiative 1) were fully 
completed by June 2017, not even the nine projects initially identified as ready to implement and 
complete within 6 to 12 months. A review report published by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries in 2016 indicated that “Thirteen (13) out of the 35 prioritised fish farms were 
implemented and are on schedule or ahead of schedule in terms of production, job creation and the 
impact on transformation” (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2016, p. 4). This 
contradicts the actual published performance data. Several interviewees suggested that, apart from 
legislative reform, the majority of aquaculture projects that succeeded did so due to the involvement 
of external stakeholders and that these projects would most likely have succeeded in the absence 
of Operation Phakisa. 
 
The establishment of an Inter-Departmental Authorisations Committee (Initiative 3), originally 
identified as a quick win, completed 21 of 33 activities by June 2017. One of the participating 
departments was yet to nominate its representatives on the committee and the terms of reference 
for the committee had not yet been approved (these activities were due in 2015), which suggests 
lack of ownership by some participants and an ineffective governance mechanism. The Steering 
Committee never met since inception (Goodwin, C. Personal interview, July 2017). 
 
There does not appear to be any significant changes to the original activities (apart from adding 
aquaculture farming projects), indicating that the aquaculture team did not adjust plans during 
implementation. This suggests that feedback mechanisms did not work, task teams did not have the 
authority to change plans and that progress was hampered by non-functioning principal-agent 
relationships and accountability chains. 
 
There are no indications that this focus area succeeded in establishing either bureaucratic of MS 
islands of effectiveness.  This is particularly disappointing since the individual aquaculture farming 
projects created real opportunities for MS governed initiatives. It is likely that the legislative and 
broader institutional environment was simply too restrictive. 
 
4.3.4. Aquaculture assessment 
The aquaculture focus area was not effective at achieving the targets set during the initial labs. It is 
clear that this focus area did not consider or address contextual, governance and enabler constraints 
(Table 4-3).  This focus area remained trapped in complex and inefficient accountability chains which 
supports the refuting of Hypotheses A1 and A2. Governance arrangements did not meet the criteria 
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for MS initiatives, despite this focus area offering significant opportunity for such initiatives and the 
general lack of results does not suggest the emergence of PE islands of effectiveness. 
 
Table 4-3: Aquaculture analysis summary 
Element What should have happened What happened  
Context  Make it clear who is in 
charge. 
 Change the rules of the 
game. 
 DAFF was put in charge. Aquaculture projects were 
removed/added subsequent to the initial labs based 
primarily on the readiness of such projects to be 
implemented and not on the relevance/importance of 
the projects in relation to the intended outcomes, which 
suggests disagreement on what had to be done. 
 Attempts at changing the rules of the game have been 
unsuccessful. 
Governance  Involve and empower the 
right stakeholders. 
 Implement effective 
governance structures. 
 It appears that most of the relevant public sector 
stakeholders were involved but not sufficiently 
empowered. 
 Escalation of blockages appears to have been 
ineffective. The Steering Committee never met and the 
DU does not appear to be effective. M&E was not 
effective with no evidence of consequences for non-
performance. 
Enablers  Ring-fence funding. 
 Avoid public sector 
accountability chains where 
possible. 
 Funding did not appear to be a major constraint 
although the October 2015 review highlighted lack of 
private investment (which is not surprising given lack of 
private stakeholders in the process). 




 Marine Protection and Governance (MPG) 
4.4.1. Initial lab 
The MPG lab aspired to “implement an overarching, integrated ocean governance framework for 
sustainable growth of the ocean economy to maximise socio-economic benefits whilst ensuring 
adequate ocean environmental protection within the next 5 years”. The final lab report identified ten 
initiatives (Table 4-12) and 327 activities (related to initiatives 4 to 10). Key stakeholders involved in 
the lab were predominantly national and provincial government departments and agencies. The lab 
estimated that implementation of the ten initiatives would cost R1.7 billion over five years, of which 
roughly half would come from already committed government programmes (Operation Phakisa 
Documents, 2014b). Ten implementing teams were established, one for each initiative. 
 
All but two of the initiatives (2 and 3) were identified as quick wins to be completed by March 2016. 
The DU was to be set up at the Department of Environmental Affairs and the Steering Committee 
was to be chaired by the Minister for Environmental Affairs. The lab suggested the establishment of 
an Oceans IMC chaired by the Minister in the Presidency and consisting of the Ministers for 
Environmental Affairs, Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, Transport, and Mineral Resources. Other 
Chapter 4 
- 48 - 
key stakeholders would include the Departments of Mineral Resources and Economic Development 
(Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014b). 
 
4.4.2. Review Workshop 
The review workshop identified the following areas negatively impacting on delivery (Operation 
Phakisa Documents, 2015b): 
 3-feet plans were not always clear and detailed enough. 
 Lack of dedicated funding for initiatives. 
 Inter-departmental collaboration insufficient. 
 
4.4.3. June 2017 progress 
The Operation Phakisa progress tracking system does not contain any data for the first three 
initiatives (Ministerial Committee and Secretariat, enhancement of legislation and review of 
legislation). Progress report data (Table 4-13) indicates that none of the initiatives was due for 
completion by June 2017. This contradicts the original lab report which showed completion times 
frames of approximately 2 years (due by end 2016) for most initiatives. Due dates for several 
activities under initiative 4 have now been extended as far as 2020. The Steering Committee has 
not met at all since inception (Goodwin, C. Personal interview, July 2017). 
 
Initiative 5 (Enhanced and Coordinated Enforcement Programme) made good progress until the 
middle of 2016 and then appears to be stuck at the adoption of terms of reference for the Compliance 
and Enforcement Working Group.  
 
4.4.4. MPG assessment 
Slow progress with most initiatives appears to be related to inefficient internal bureaucratic 
processes. MPG was hampered by non-functioning principal-agent relationships and did not 
succeed in establishing either bureaucratic of MS islands of effectiveness. This focus area did not 
sufficiently consider or address contextual, governance and enabler constraints (Table 4-4) which 
supports the refuting of Hypotheses A1 and A2. Governance arrangements did not meet the criteria 
for MS initiatives and the general lack of results does not suggest the emergence of PE islands of 
effectiveness. 
 
Table 4-4: MPG analysis summary 
Element What should have happened What happened  
Context  Make it clear who is in 
charge. 
 Change the rules of the 
game. 
 DEA was put in charge. Adaptation mostly resulted in 
extended deadlines and not in changes to content. 
 Attempts at changing the rules of the game have been 
unsuccessful. 
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Element What should have happened What happened  
Governance  Involve and empower the 
right stakeholders.  
 Implement effective 
governance structures. 
 It appears that most of the relevant stakeholders were 
involved but not sufficiently empowered. 
 Does not appear to have managed multiple-hierarchy 
complexities. Escalation of blockages appears to have 
been ineffective. Steering Committee never met which 
lead to a lack of coordination in implementation. 
Feedback loops appear not be working and there is no 
evidence of consequences for non-performance.  Lack 
of progress data on some initiatives suggests poor 
M&E. 
Enablers  Ring-fence funding. 
 Avoid public sector 
accountability chains where 
possible. 
 October review highlighted lack funding as a stumbling 
block, suggesting the inability of participants to escalate 
blockages. 




 Marine Transport and Manufacturing (MTM) 
4.5.1. Initial lab 
The lab set overall targets of 15,000 jobs and an annual contribution to GDP of R15 billion. The final 
lab report identified 18 initiatives (Table 4-14) with 183 activities. Key stakeholders involved in the 
lab were predominantly national and provincial government departments and agencies and a few 
industry bodies. The majority of the key industry players identified during the lab were not initially 
part of the lab process. (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014c).  
 
All but initiatives 8, 9, 11 and 18 were identified as quick wins with the first results to be evident by 
March 2016. The DU was to be set up at the Department of Transport and the Steering Committee 
was to be chaired by the Minister for Transport. An implementing team was established for each of 
the 18 initiatives (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014c). 
 
The MTM focus area would rely heavily on investment from both public and private sectors. Involving 
external stakeholders from the private sector during implementation would therefore have been 
essential to the success of this focus area. 
 
4.5.2. Review workshop 
The review workshop gathered about 60 participants primarily from government departments and 
agencies. The review workshop identified the following areas impacting negatively on delivery 
(Operation Phakisa Documents, 2015c): 
 Delay in enabling government policies; 
 Plans lacked details and were not always of good quality; 
 Limited involvement and commitment of the industry and procuring entities; 
Chapter 4 
- 50 - 
 Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA) had to shift from a business as usual mindset to a 
Phakisa mindset; 
 Institutional arrangements were not functioning well; 
 Limited availability and capacity of institutions to conduct training; 
 Lack of dedicated budget for Oceans Economy Phakisa and no budget for DU; 
 DU not functioning and Steering Committee had not been meeting; 
 Inadequate reporting (lack of consolidation, tools and tracking of KPIs); and 
 Ministers not resolving blockages and Presidency to play a more active role. 
 
4.5.3. June 2017 Progress 
The original lab report envisaged completion of seven initiatives by the end of 2016. Progress report 
data (Table 4-15) shows the extension of several deadlines and indicates that none of the three 
initiatives due for completion by June 2017 had been completed. Only 29 (10.3%) of the 281 activities 
due by June 2017 had been completed and 12 of the 18 initiatives did not complete any activities. 
The Steering Committee had not met since inception (Goodwin, C. Personal interview, July 2017). 
By July 2017 MTM projects have attracted investment commitments of R4 billion from the public 
sector and R1.1 billion from the private sector (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2017e). 
 
Initiative 6 (Unlock investment in new and existing port facilities) made good initial progress but has 
not been able to develop a project plan for maintenance and refurbishment since 2014. The major 
stumbling block appears to be an inefficient TNPA and a lack of cooperation between TNPA and 
relevant industries. 
 
While this area seems to be lagging behind in achieving targets, it should be noted that the majority 
of targets required significant effort and investment. The enabling legislative environment that impact 
this focus area was mostly in place before the lab (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
This focus area seems to have selected more difficult targets, aimed at longer-term impact rather 
than quick success stories – the addition of three ships flying the South African flag (over a period 
of 2 years) received much political and media attention, despite the minimal impact of this 
achievement. It would appear that the original design of this focus area could have been influenced 
by the desire to generate quick wins and grab headlines (suggesting isomorphic mimicry). This focus 
area does not appear to have been successful at establishing islands of effectiveness. 
 
4.5.4. MTM assessment 
MTM performed worst of the four focus areas in terms of achieving targets.  As with the previous two 
focus areas, MTM appears to be hampered by ineffective accountability chains and the focus area 
failed to address contextual, governance and enabler constraints (Table 4-5) which supports the 
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refuting of Hypotheses A1 and A2. Governance arrangements did not meet the criteria for MS 
initiatives and the poor results do not suggest the emergence of PE islands of effectiveness. 
 
Table 4-5: MTM analysis summary 
Element What should have happened What happened  
Context  Make it clear who is in 
charge. 
 Change the rules of the 
game. 
 DoT was put in charge. Adaptation mostly resulted in 
extended deadlines and not in changes to content. 
 Legislative reform was not a priority under this initiative.  
The rules of the game were either supportive of the 
initiative or were not considered at all. 
Governance  Involve and empower the 
right stakeholders.  
 Implement effective 
governance structures. 
 It appears that most of the relevant stakeholders were 
involved but not sufficiently empowered. 
 Steering Committee never met and escalation of 
blockages appear to have been ineffective. Focus area 
involved both government and the private sector but 
lack of coordination in implementation evident. 
Ineffective TNPA seems to hamper progress. This area 
carries high a risk of predation but there is no evidence 
of this risk materialising. No evidence of consequences 
for non-performance and M&E data not always up to 
date.  
Enablers  Ring-fence funding. 
 Avoid public sector 
accountability chains where 
possible. 
 Funding appears to have been a major stumbling block 
that remains unresolved.  




 Offshore Oil and Gas (O&G) 
4.6.1. Initial lab 
The lab aspired to achieve 30 exploration wells in the next 10 years, contributing 130,000 jobs and 
US$2.2billion annually to GDP. The final lab report identified 11 initiatives (Table 4-16) with 56 KPIs 
and 270 activities. Key stakeholders involved in the lab included government departments, 
government agencies/enterprises, NGOs and private sector companies (Operation Phakisa 
Documents, 2014d). An implementing team was established for each of the 11 initiatives. 
 
Initiatives F1, E1, D1 and C1 were identified as the highest priority. The DU was to be set up at the 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and the Steering Committee was to be chaired by the 
Minister for Mineral Resources. The main participants in the Steering Committee would be the 
Directors General from the DMR, Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Water and Sanitation 
(DWS), DEA, DTI, the CEOs of the Petroleum Agency of South Africa (PASA) and the Central Energy 
Fund (CEF), the Office of the Deputy President and representatives from coastal provinces 
(Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014d). 
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The private sector played a limited role in the lab as the main objective of the lab was to create an 
enabling environment for future offshore oil and gas exploration (which would require significant 
private sector investment) (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
4.6.2. Review workshop 
The review workshop gathered 37 participants from the private and public sectors. The review 
workshop identified the following areas impacting on delivery (Operation Phakisa Documents, 
2015d): 
 Slow processes within institutions; 
 Lack of ownership of detailed plans and non-participation of some key stakeholders; 
 The Ministers sitting in the IMC were all peers, Ministerial decision-making took too long, 
directives were not always enforced and there were no consequences for non-execution. The DU 
asked the Presidency to play a more active “apex” role in Operation Phakisa to break through 
such deadlocks (96% of the 37 participants regarded this as a significant challenge); 
 Insufficient communication with and commitment from industry; 
 Lack of dedicated resources (budget and human resources) deployed by 
departments/stakeholders to Operation Phakisa structures/activities; 
 The Steering Committee was not operational and monitoring activities were not effective; 
 Responsibilities of government employees i.t.o. Operation Phakisa were not included in their 
performance agreements; 
 Private sector organisations did not provide sufficient information about their supply chain 
processes to enable an understanding of their operations; 
 Insufficient involvement of tertiary institutions in skills development; and 
 The drop in the oil prices would negatively impact oil rig repairs and refurbishment. 
 
4.6.3. June 2017 Progress 
The original lab report envisaged completion of six initiatives by June 2017. Progress report data 
(Table 4-17) shows that initiatives B2 and B3 had been completed and that there had been several 
changes to the number and content of activities. Of the 238 activities due by June 2017, 232 (97.5%) 
had been completed. Proposed governance structures were adapted to the unique requirements of 
the Oil and Gas focus area (Annexure 5).  There has been some adjustment to the original due dates 
for all of the initiatives. The Steering Committee has met twice since inception (Bonga, M. Personal 
interview, 10 October 2017).  
 
Initiative A1 is complex with long implementation timeframes. The initiative is progressing well with 
only three overdue activities. Cooperation among government stakeholders appears to be managed 
efficiently. Initiatives in group B, focusing on the broader environment impacting on the focus area, 
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have been mostly completed, albeit somewhat later than envisaged in the original lab report. The 
completion of initiative C1 has been extended to April 2018. Initiative D1 is on track for completion 
by the end of 2019 and completion of initiative D2 (three activities remaining) has been extended to 
September 2019. Initiative E1 which required migration of the PASA from the CEF to DMR, seems 
to have been delayed by political processes. 
 
By July 2017 O&G projects have attracted investment commitments of R10.8 billion from the public 
sector and R7.6 billion from the private sector (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2017e).  
 
4.6.4. O&G assessment 
O&G performed best of the four focus areas in terms of achieving targets.  Several interviewees 
indicated that the success of this focus area could be attributed to the personal effort and dedication 
of the head of the DU at the DMR as well as the commitment of both the Director General and 
Minister for Mineral Resources to drive implementation and resolve blockages. This focus area 
appears to have considered and addressed most contextual, governance and enabler constraints 
(Table 4-6) which does not support the refuting of Hypotheses A1 and A2. There is no evidence of 
multi-stakeholder governance initiatives but some evidence of public entrepreneurs driving 
implementation. The O&G focus area is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 4-6: O&G analysis summary 
Element What should have happened What happened  
Context  Make it clear who is in 
charge 
 Change the rules of the 
game 
 DMR was put in charge. Adaptation resulted in 
extended deadlines and in changes to content. 
 Legislative reform was a priority under this initiative but 
progress was not tracked. 
Governance  Involve and empower the 
right stakeholders  
 Implement effective 
governance structures 
 It appears that most of the relevant stakeholders were 
involved and sufficiently empowered. 
 Governance arrangements were effective.  This could 
be a function of design or due to the role of public 
entrepreneurs.  
Enablers  Ring-fence funding 
 Avoid public sector 
accountability chains where 
possible 
 While no funding was ring-fenced, it would appear that 
most funding constraints were addressed. 
 Significant reliance on public sector accountability 
chains did not hamper implementation, possibly due to 
the role of public entrepreneurs. 
Source: Author 
 
 Overall assessment of the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa 
Of the 71.5% of targets due by June 2017, only 47.7% were actually achieved and only 60.4% of 
targets achieved were done so on time (Table 4-1). The assessment (achievement of targets) of the 
Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa suggests that the achievement of results to date were neither 
big not fast.  
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The original governance model proposed for Operation Phakisa (Annexure 2) recommended three 
structures per initiative (Workgroups, Delivery Unit and Steering Committee) and one overall 
coordinating structure (Executive Issue Resolution Committee).  The revised governance model 
(Annexure 3) as implemented added two more overall coordinating structures.  The governance 
model was further heavily dependent on public sector accountability chains which, given the South 
Africa context described earlier, exposed the Phakisa process to the risks associated with a 
contested political environment and relatively personalised institutions.  
 
All interviewees agreed that governance structures were, for the most part, ineffective and not 
supporting implementation and the unblocking of bottlenecks as originally intended. LCCs were 
seldom attended by the Directors General who were meant to coordinate and unblock delivery at 
implementation level. Officials chairing and participating in the DUs did not appear to have the 
mandate to take meaningful decisions (with the exception of O&G), which often resulted in this part 
of the governance structure regurgitating obstacles to implementation rather than finding and 
implementing solutions.  
 
The original Operation Phakisa model envisaged a direct line between the Head of each DU and 
his/her Director General and Minister. Except for Oil and Gas, DUs ended up being located lower 
down within the normal bureaucratic accountability chains, which appears to have contributed to 
slower than expected progress (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017).  The non-
establishment of steering Committees by most Departments appear to have compounded these 
weaknesses. 
 
A key failure of the overall process was therefore a lack of agreed upon and approved roles, 
responsibilities and authority of governance structures.  The general lack of clear leadership 
responsibilities that was highlighted during the October 2015 review workshop manifests in a lack of 
consequences for non-achievement of targets and overall slow progress.  Uncertainty around overall 
leadership roles of the Minister in The Presidency and the Minister for Environmental Affairs is likely 
to have contributed to this. Although Operation Phakisa was initiated by President Jacob Zuma, he 
was more of a political champion than an active participant in the process. Review reports suggest 
that the President or Deputy President could have played a more active role in directing and 
removing obstacles. 
 
There is some evidence of pre-existing projects that were brought into the fold of the Phakisa 
process. Operation Phakisa therefore could be claiming some successes that cannot be directly 
attributable to the labs. In some instances early successes, although low in impact, were widely 
publicised for political gain. There is also evidence of reporting officials unilaterally extending 
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deadlines in the reporting system to improve achievement scores (Goodwin, C. Personal interview, 
July 2017).  
 
In the absence of clear and uncontested accountability chains, success would ultimately depend on 
one or more individuals taking charge and establishing authority in a particular area. This appears 
to have happened in the O&G focus area only. Creating an enabling legislative environment was an 
important element of three of the four initiatives.  This process would invariably depend on political 
principals and public sector capacity.  Based on progress report data Operation Phakisa has to date 
not been successful at changing the rules of the game by creating an enabling legislative 
environment for most of the initiatives identified.  
 
Involving the right stakeholders is an important element of the BFR process and was identified as a 
crucial element of the original Phakisa methodology.  While the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa 
was successful at drawing in relevant stakeholders from government (departments, agencies and 
state-owned enterprises) it did not involve the private sector in any meaningful way. Securing 
appropriate funding played an important role in all the initiatives.  In most cases, both public and 
private sector funding were committed on paper but it is not clear whether these commitments will 
be honoured given the slow progress on most initiatives. The private sector is likely to adopt a wait 
and see approach and will only release funding in cases where this would result in actual benefits. 
 
The refuting of Hypothesis A1 in Chapter 3 led to the identification of six elements or criteria (Table 
3-5) that could be used to test Hypothesis A2.  The preceding analysis, as summarised in Table 4-7, 
shows that three focus areas did not meet any of the criteria and the Oil and Gas focus area met 
only three.   
 
Table 4-7: Assessment summary 
Element What should have happened 
Did it happen 
Aqua MTM MPG O&G 
Context Make it clear who is in charge No No No No 
Change the rules of the game No No No No 
Governance Involve and empower the right stakeholders  No No No Yes 
Implement effective governance structures No No No Yes 
Enablers Ring-fence funding No No No Yes 
Avoid public sector accountability chains No No No No 
Source: Author 
 
The analysis therefore concludes that the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa did not design and 
implement effective and context-appropriate institutions and delivery transmission mechanisms that 
achieved real developmental results (with the possible exception of the O&G focus area), which 
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refutes Hypotheses A2.  The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa was therefore mere isomorphic 
mimicry, rather than a genuine attempt at doing things differently. 
 
The analysis further shows that the design and implementation of Operation Phakisa did not create 
an appropriate framework for multi-stakeholder governed delivery transmission mechanisms, which 
refutes Hypothesis B2.  An assessment of the four focus areas in relation to the four Hypotheses is 
summarised in table Table 4-8.  
 
Table 4-8: Focus area / Hypotheses matrix 
Focus Area 
Analysis supports refuting of Hypothesis 
A1 A2 B1 B2 
Aquaculture Yes Yes Inconclusive Yes 
MTM Yes Yes Inconclusive Yes 
MPG Yes Yes Yes Yes 
O&G Inconclusive Inconclusive No Yes 
Source: Author 
 
With both Hypotheses A1 and A2 refuted, it is evident that the effectiveness of Operation Phakisa 
was limited by both broader public sector capacity as well as its own design (Table 4-9: Scenario 4). 
Based on this assertion the success of specific initiatives under the Oceans Economy Operation 
Phakisa would depend largely on the emergence of islands of effectiveness.  
 
Table 4-9 Hypothesis A matrix – second application 
Hypothesis A2 not refuted A2 refuted 
A1 not refuted Scenario 1. Public sector capacity and the 
design of Operation Phakisa is unlikely to 
have negatively impacted Operation 
Phakisa.  
Scenario 3. The effectiveness of Operation 
Phakisa was limited by its own design, 
rather than broader public sector capacity 
A1 refuted Scenario 2. While public sector capacity 
did not create an enabling environment, 
Operation Phakisa was able to overcome 
this limitation through context-appropriate 
design. 
Scenario 4. The effectiveness of Operation 
Phakisa was limited by both broader public 
sector capacity as well as its own design. 
Source: Author 
 
In order to test Hypothesis B1, the Oil & Gas focus area is studied further in Chapter 5 to establish 
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Tables: Initial lab reports summaries and June 2017 progress report data 
4.7.1. Aquaculture 
Table 4-10: Lab report summary: Aquaculture 
# Initiative Lead Expected completion Est. investment 
1 Aquaculture projects (24 individual projects: Phase 1 was to 
expand nine existing aquaculture farms while phases 2 and 





December 2019 R2.8 billion of which R1.2 
billion from government 
2 Legislative reform to promote aquaculture development 
(reducing red tape) 
DEA/DAFF December 2016 R9.0-11.7 million 
3 Establishment of an Inter-departmental Authorisations 
Committee to reduce average licensing and registration 
processing times from 2.5 years to less than 1 year 
DAFF December 2016 R2 million 
4 Establishment of a globally recognised monitoring and 
certification system 
DAFF December 2016 – ongoing R10.8 million p.a. 
5 Establishment of an Aquaculture Development Fund DAFF April 2015 R6 million 





Ongoing R208 million 
7 Resource and coordinate industry-wide marketing efforts AquaSA Ongoing R55 million 
8 Government Preferential Procurement of aquaculture 
projects 
DAFF Ongoing R7 million 
Compiled from final lab report (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014a): 
 









1a Expansion- Ventersdorp- Catfish No data      
1b Phase 1: Expansion- Doringbaai- Abalone 13 8 7 1 8% 5 
1c Hatchery expansion- Paternoster- Oyster 44 43 - 43 98% - 
1d Expansion- Hamburg Oysters 36 33 20 13 36% 5 
1e Phase 1: Oceanwise (Pty) Ltd Expansion  103 79 25 55 53% 19 
1f Phase 1: Expansion Abalone Farm - HIK Buffeljags 68 49 41 10 15% 24 
1g Phase 1: Expansion- Overberg Abagold- Abalone 19 12 17 - 0% 11 
1h Phase 1: Expansion - JSP - Abalone 23 2 2 - 0% - 
1k Phase 2: New- Hamburg cluster- Kob 126 76 29 49 39% 11 
1l Molapong Aquaculture Trout / Salmon farm Saldana. 38 19 12 8 21% 5 
1o Phase 3: Expansion- Saldanha Blue Ocean Mussels 52 40 15 26 50% 15 
1r Phase 3: New- Richards Bay Sea Cage Farming 104 65 5 60 58% 3 
1s DST Hondeklip Bay Abalone Hatchery  81 60 3 57 70% 2 
1t Diamond Coast Abalone (Pty) Ltd / Establish 59 24 20 4 7% 11 
1u Expansion- Saldanha Bay Oyster Company- Oyster 41 24 15 9 22% 13 
1v Wild Coast Abalone Expansion 166 120 37 83 50% 22 
1v(b) Wild Coast Abalone Ranching/Stock Enhancement 62 42 2 40 65% 1 
1w Romanbay Sea Farm Expansion 50 43 25 19 38% 3 
1x Abalone Farm Expansion activity - Marine Growers 29 24 4 20 69% - 
1aa WestCoast Oyster Growers 26 26 22 4 15% 7 
1bb Blue Sapphire Pearls 73 51 13 38 52% 7 
1cc Imbaza Mussels ( Pty) Ltd 34 24 14 12 35% 10 
1dd African Olive Trading 38 19 15 5 13% 12 
1ee Oyster Catcher Aquaculture 55 36 8 28 51% 3 
1ff Chapmans Aquaculture Company 52 39 16 23 44% 6 
1gg Requa Enterprises (Pty)Ltd 51 39 13 26 51% 6 
1hh Southern Atlantic Sea Farms ( SASF) 60 52 33 19 32% 14 
1ii Hermanus Salmon 34 21 - 21 62% - 
1jj Vaal Fisheries 103 37 22 15 15% 14 
2 Legislative reform to promote Aquaculture development 74 72 48 24 32% 23 
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3 Inter-departmental Authorisations Committee 33 33 21 12 36% 5 
4a Globally recognised monitoring & certification system 19 19 5 14 74% 3 
4b Globally recognised monitoring & certification system 
(Quick wins) 
34 34 30 4 12% 16 
5 Aquaculture development fund 35 35 15 20 57% 9 
6 Capacity at DAFF and the Delivery Unit 41 41 22 19 46% 4 
7 Resource Aquaculture South Africa (AquaSA) 25 21 13 8 32% 5 
7a Improve and coordinate market intelligence initiatives 16 15 7 8 50% 1 
7b Improve domestic market access 23 14 1 13 57% - 
7c Strengthen emerging producers through increasing 
value chain ownership and product development 
13 7 - 7 54% - 
7d Promote responsible, fair regulation and environmental 
certification 
16 16 5 11 69% 1 
8 Government Preferential Procurement 57 53 12 41 72% 5 
TOTAL 2 026 1 467 614 869 43% 301 
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017b) 
 
4.7.2. MPG 
Table 4-12: Lab report summary: MPG 
# Initiative Lead Expected completion Est. investment 
1 Ministerial Committee and Secretariat to Govern Activities DEA October 2015 R9 million per year 
2 Enhancement of Legislation into the Integrated Coastal and 
Oceans Management Act or Oceans Act 
DEA Revised legislation to 
Parliament by February 
2016 
None 
3 Review of ocean-related legislation DEA Survey and list completed 
by March 2015 
None 
4 Accelerated Capacity Building Intervention in Ocean 
Governance 
DHET Ongoing R4 million 
5 Enhanced and Coordinated Enforcement Programme DAFF March 2016 R13 million 
6 National Ocean and Coastal Information System and 
Extending Earth Observation Capacity 
DEA Information system 
architecture completed by 
2016 
R463 million 
7 National Ocean and Coastal Water Quality Monitoring 
Programme 
DEA Laboratory set up and 
operational by 2016 
R1 billion (mostly existing 
funded programmes). 
8 Creation of a Marine Protected Area Representative 
Network 
DEA Operational by end 2017 R6 million 
9 Marine Protected Area / Marine Spatial Planning Discovery, 
Research & Monitoring Programme 
DST, DEA Operational by end 2016 R133 million (R76 million 
new funding ) 
10 Marine spatial planning DEA National framework 
completed by end 2016 
Provincial framework 
completed by end 2017 
R88 million 
Compiled from final lab report (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014b): 
 









1 Ministerial Committee and Secretariat to Govern 
Activities 
108*      
2 Enhancement of Legislation into the Integrated Coastal 
and Oceans Management Act or Oceans Act 
?*      
3 Review of ocean-related legislation 36*      
4 Accelerated capacity building intervention in ocean 
governance 
63  15  5  10  16% 4  
5 Enhance and Coordinated Enforcement Programme 56  54  44  10  18% 35  
6 Ocean & Coastal Information Management System & 
Extending oceans & coasts earth observation capabilities 
48  32  25  8  17% 21  
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7 National Oceans & Coasts Pollution Monitoring 
Programme 
40  28  21  7  18% 17  
8 Creation of a MPA Representative Network 26  22  20  2  8% 15  
9 MPA/MSP Discovery, Research & Monitoring 
Programme 
34  22  16  6  18% 10  
10 Marine Spatial Planning 60  49  47  2  3% 26  
TOTAL 327  222  178  45  13.8% 128  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017b) 
*Data obtained from final lab report. No data on tracking system and therefore excluded from totals. 
 
4.7.3. MTM 
Table 4-14: Lab report summary: MTM 
# Initiative Lead Expected completion Est. investment 
1 Create supportive funding and revenue model DTI January 2015 R1 million 
2 Establish purpose-built oil and gas port infrastructure and 
appoint Facility Operators – Saldanha Bay 
TNPA December 2017 R9.6 billion TNPA and 
R3.6 billion private. 
3 Align on implementation of government policy DoT end 2014 None 
4 Prioritise Transnet and TNPA funding allocation towards 
marine manufacturing facilities 
DPE end 2014 None 
5 Maintain and refurbish existing facilities TNPA November 2016 R1 billion 
6 Unlock investment in new and existing port facilities TNPA March 2015 R10.9 billion TNPA and 
R4.9 billion private 
7 Implement Strategic Prioritised Projects – Richards Bay DoT end 2017 R550 million TNPA and 
R300 million private  
8 Implement Strategic Prioritised Projects – East London TNPA August 2015 R215 million TNPA and 
R350 million private  
9 Train 2,550 TVET College graduates on an 18-month 
workplace-based Experiential Learner Programme in 
scarce and critical trades over 5 years 
DHET March 2019 R730 million 
10 Create dedicated Occupational Teams for MTM Sector 
(Professional, Artisans, Operators & Seafarers 
OPOCT March 2019 R65 million 
11 Establish Trade RPL/CBMT/Centres of Specialisation in 
Saldanha Bay and Richards Bay 
OPOCT May 2019 R122 million 
12 Train 18,172 learners as artisans, semi-skilled workers and 
professionals over the next 5 years 
OPOCT May 2019 R2.4 billion 
13 Increase usage of ESSA system & targeted career 
awareness services as a high-value recruitment tool for 
MTM 
DoL March 2019 R20 million 
14 Increase capacity to develop skills for ~1,200 ratings and 
~720 officers per year 
DHET Annual target R5.2 billion 
15 Create a public procurement and localisation programme DTI March 2019 R5 million 
16 Strategic Marketing Campaign DTI March 2016 None 
17 Propose inclusion of preferential procurement clause in the 
African Maritime Charter 
DIRCO July 2017 None 
18 Support local registry of vessels through incentives and 
encouragement of using SA-flagged ships 
PetroSA, 
DMR, DBSA 
September 2017 R1.2 billion 
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1 Create supportive funding and revenue model 6  6  - 6  100% - 
2 Establish purpose-built oil and gas port infrastructure 
(Berth 205 and Mossgas Quay) and appoint Facility 
Operators – Saldanha Bay  
19  10  - 10  52.6% - 
3 Align on implementation of government policy 15  13  - 13  86.7% - 
4 Prioritise Transnet and TNPA funding allocation towards 
marine manufacturing 
9  8  - 8  88.9% - 
5 Maintain and refurbish existing facilities  9  7  7  - 0.0% 1  
6 Unlock investment in new and existing port facilities  11  11  3  8  72.7% 3  
7 Implement Strategic Prioritised Projects – Richards Bay  15  13  - 13  86.7% - 
8 Implement Strategic Prioritised Projects – East London  16  10  1  9  56.3% 1  
9 Train 2,550 TVET College graduates on an 18-month 
Workplace-based Experiential Learner Programme in 
scarce & critical Trades over the 5 year period 
18  12  - 12  66.7% - 
10 Create dedicated Occupational Teams for MTM Sector 
(Professional, Trades, Operators & Seafarers) 
23  22  2  20  87.0% - 
11 Establish Trade RPL/CBMT/Centres of Specialisation in 
Saldanha Bay and Richards Bay 
14  6  - 6  42.9% - 
12: Train 18,172 Learners as Artisans, Semi-skilled 
workers & Professionals over the next 5 years 
14  10  - 10  71.4% - 
13: Increase usage of ESSA system & targeted career 
awareness services as a high value recruitment tool for 
MTM 
23  21  - 21  91.3% - 
14: Increase capacity to Develop Skills for Seafarers 48  38  - 38  79.2% - 
15: Create and implement a public procurement and 
localisation programme 
33  29  1  28  84.8% - 
16: Develop a strategic marketing campaign and value 
proposition for target markets 
25  14  - 14  56.0% - 
17: Propose inclusion of preferential procurement clause in 
the African Maritime Charter 
7  7  - 7  100.0% - 
18: Support local registry of vessels through incentives and 
encouragement of using SA-flagged ships for cargo and 
coastal operations 
44  44  15  29  65.9% 9  
TOTAL 349  281  29  252  72.2% 14  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017b) 
 
4.7.4. O&G 
Table 4-16: Lab report summary: O&G 
# Initiative Lead Expected completion Est. investment 
A1 Develop phased gas pipeline network DoE Stage 1: Sept. 2015, 
Stage 2: April 2018, Stage 3: 
April 2019 
R1.8 billion 
B1 Conduct joint industry/government emergency response 
drills 
DEA May 2016 R13 million 
B2 Operationalise IOPC fund DoT March 2015 R0.7 million 
B3 Exploiting Marine Research Opportunities DST Operational from 2016 R18 million 
C1 Develop/implement local content roadmap DTI August 2016 R100 million 
D1 Develop/implement skills strategy roadmap DHET August 2019 R63 million 
D2 Develop capability for sub-surface research and data 
gathering 
PASA May 2016 R264 million 
E1 Build end-to-end institutional structure DMR January 2016 R598 million 
E2 Enhance environmental governance capacity of the Oil and 
Gas regulator 
DEA December 2017 R11 million 
E3 Promote awareness of O&G industry DMR December 2017 R8 million 
F1 Provide legislative clarity and stability NT Immediately None 
Compiled from final lab report (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014d): 
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A1: Development of phased gas pipeline network 124  35  32  3  2% 23  
B1: Joint industry-government emergency response drills 38  29  30  - 0% 28  
B2: Operationalise the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation (IOPC) Fund 
8  8  8  - 0% 4  
B3: Exploiting the Broader Research Opportunities 
Presented by Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration 
60  60  60  - 0% 52  
C1: Develop local content roadmap 11  5  5  - 0% 4  
D1: Local Skills Development 19  15  13  2  11% 13  
D2: Develop capability for sub-surface research and data 
gathering 
25  22  22  - 0% 19  
E1: Achieve a streamlined and efficient E2E institutional 
structure for regulation of O&G Exploration and Production 
23  7  5  2  9% 4  
E2: Enhance environmental governance capacity of the Oil 
and Gas regulator 
67  48  48  1  1% 37  
E3: Promote awareness of the Oil and Gas industry 13  9  9  - 0% 9  
TOTAL 388  238  232  8  2.1% 193  




- 62 - 
 
This chapter will focus on Offshore Oil and Gas as the focus area that performed best in terms of 
achievement of targets by the end of June 2017. The chapter provides a more in-depth analysis of 
activities within each initiative to determine the reasons for achieving or not achieving targets. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of findings based on the application of the frameworks developed 
in Chapter 2 and overall analysis done in Chapter 4 to determine the extent to which public 
entrepreneurs were responsible for the success of this initiative. 
 
Summaries of progress are based on unpublished detailed progress report data as at 1 September 
2017 obtained from the DPME Operation Phakisa Unit. 
 
 Overview of Oil and Gas focus area 
South Africa’s coast and adjoining waters have estimated resources of approximately 9 billion barrels 
of oil and 11 billion barrels oil equivalent of natural gas. The O&G lab work stream developed 11 
initiatives with an ultimate target of drilling 30 exploration wells in 10 years, leading to the production 
of 370,000 barrels of oil and gas per day (approximately 80% of current oil and gas imports). This 
should result in 150,000 jobs and a contribution of US $2.2 billion to GDP. In order to create the 
enabling environment to give industry the comfort to invest in this capital-intensive sector, the work 
stream outlined some initial targets towards these goals (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014d): 
 Provide clarity and stability in the legislative framework governing offshore O&G; 
 Build a “one-stop shop” within the DMR to streamline and regulate the licensing process for 
offshore O&G exploration and production; 
 Conduct emergency response drills to establish a world-class oil spill response capacity in South 
Africa and make the International Oil Pollution and Compensation Fund operational; and 
 Exploit research opportunities presented by offshore O&G explorations that will unlock data 
ecosystems, marine resources, and ocean-related renewable energy. 
 
Key stakeholders in the O&G focus area are the Offshore Petroleum Association of South Africa 
(OPASA), a member-funded representative body for the offshore upstream petroleum industry in 
South Africa and the government departments/agencies mandated to implement the various 
initiatives and projects (Operation Phakisa Documents, 2014d).   
 
The Head of the O&G DU and the Director General of DMR took an early decision to formalise the 
nomination of chairpersons (based in the relevant departments) and members of the 11 different 
working groups.  Letters were written to the heads of the relevant departments and entities to request 
nominations to ensure that nominated members had the authority to represent their respective 
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organisations and that members would commit sufficient time to the Operation Phakisa process 
(Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
 Detailed Oil and Gas progress reports per initiative 
The initial lab report estimated the total investment required to implement all 11 initiatives to be R2.8 
billion with R1 billion from government and R1.8 billion from non-government sources (Operation 
Phakisa Documents, 2014d). Table 5-1 summarises overall progress in the O&G focus area as at 1 
September 2017. The DU early on adopted very strict M&E rules that required performance reports 
to be accompanied by verifiable and auditable portfolios of evidence (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 
10 October 2017). 
 




Activities due by report 
date 
Due activities completed 
by report date 
Completed on / ahead of 
time 
# % # % # % 
A1 124  38  30.6% 37  97.4% 28  75.7% 
B1 38  29  76.3% 30  103.4% 28  93.3% 
B2 8  8  100.0% 8  100.0% 4  50.0% 
B3 60  60  100.0% 60  100.0% 52  86.7% 
C1 11  6  54.5% 6  100.0% 5  83.3% 
D1 19  17  89.5% 14  82.4% 14  100.0% 
D2 25  22  88.0% 22  100.0% 19  86.4% 
E1 23  11  47.8% 8  72.7% 7  87.5% 
E2 67  52  77.6% 50  96.2% 39  78.0% 
E3 13  9  69.2% 9  100.0% 9  100.0% 
11 388 252 64.9% 244  96.8% 205  84.0% 
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
Detailed progress reports are discussed in order of priority, as identified during the initial lab. Original 
projects/activities/due dates are indicated in black, revised projects/activities/due dates (if 
applicable) are indicated in blue and removed projects/activities (if applicable) are indicated in red.  
As at 3 February 2018, progress reports on the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa was last 
updated on 22 September 2017. 
 
5.2.1. F1: Provide legislative clarity and stability. Led by National Treasury – Had to be done 
immediately. Estimated investment: None. 
There is no reporting data available for this initiative. After the initial lab stakeholders agreed that 
there was no need for a detailed 3-feet plan, but progress on this initiative was reported at every IMC 
meeting. Finalisation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources amendment bill was coordinated by 
the DMR, supported by National Treasury and OPASA. The bill is currently before Parliament 
(Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). This initiative succeeded in drafting amendments 
to legislation through the efforts of public employees. 
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5.2.2. E1: Achieve a streamlined and efficient end-to-end institutional structure for regulation of O&G 
Exploration and Production. Led by DMR. Estimated investment: R598 million (Government funding 
only). 












Finalise decision on optimal structure 4 2014/12/15 
2017/05/01 
4 - Completed 2 years 
after original due date 




4 3  
Designate as the DMR-owned public entity 
responsible for data management and promotion 
1 2015/01/31 
2018/05/01 
- -  
Implement a change management programme 5 2015/06/15 
2018/10/30 
- -  
Go Live!!! 1 2015/01/31 
2018/11/30 
- -  
TOTAL 23  8 2  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
Initial delays were experienced due to some reluctance at a political level to transfer PASA to DMR. 
Intervention by the Minister and Director General for Mineral Resources as well as the head of the 
DU resulted in the completion of most of the work related to this initiative. Reporting data on 1 
September 2017 was not up to date due to insufficient portfolios of evidence supporting the progress 
data (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
5.2.3. D1: Local Skills Development. Led by DHET. Estimated investment: R63 million (Government: 
R52 million, Non-government: R11 million). 












Formation of a working group 4 2014/12/31 4 - Completed on time 
Develop a skills strategy roadmap 5/6 2015/01/31 
2015/12/30 
6 - Completed on time 
(new time frames) 




2 2 1st round 
unsuccessful, 
advertised again 




1 -  
Launch Chapters of Professional Associations 1 2020/12/31 - - On track 
Establish vocational training centres for scarce 
and critical skills 
2 2015/12/31 1 1 Significantly behind 
schedule.  
TOTAL 19  14 2  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The first call for nominations of University and Development Chairs was unsuccessful and had to be 
re-advertised. The second call for nominations resulted in the appointment of a research chair.  While 
somewhat behind schedule, the initiative was on track for completion of the first three projects by 
the end of 2017 (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
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5.2.4. C1: Develop local content roadmap. Led by DTI. Estimated investment: R100 million 
(Government funding only). 












Conduct financial analysis (baseline) of South 
African offshore O&G sector procurement 
3 2015/08/01 3 - Completed on time 
Set targets for minimum local production and 
supply in proportion to total domestic upstream 
O&G value chain spend 
5 2016/08/01 
2017/10/03 
3 -  
Establish national enterprise & supplier 
development and training programme for 
upstream O&G  
3 2016/08/01 
2018/04/03 
- -  
TOTAL 11  6   
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The initiative was on track to meet the revised deadlines (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 
2017). It is not clear why National Treasury, with overall responsibility for government procurement 
regulations, did not play a more prominent role in this initiative. 
 
5.2.5. B3: Exploiting the Broader Research Opportunities Presented by Offshore O&G Exploration. 
Led by DST. Estimated investment: R18 million (Government funding only). 












Project Design 4 2014/10/08 
2015/02/28 
4 - Completed ahead 
revised of schedule 
Tender process and tracking 7 2015/02/25 - - Activities removed 
Stakeholder Analyses and Database 6 2015/03/24 6 - Completed 1 month 
after due date 
Establish and maintain multi-stakeholder project 
management team (PMT) 
7 2016/01/07 7 - Completed 7 months 
ahead of schedule 
Contracting of NRF 6 2015/04/30 6 - Completed ahead of 
schedule 
Kick-start workshop - Research Gap Analysis 8 2015/03/20 
2015/07/24 
8 - Completed on time 
Research Catalogue – Gap analysis 5 2015/06/08 - - Activities removed 
Research Opportunity Exploitation (ROE) reports 
& agreements  
8 2015/10/01 
2015/10/22 
8 - Completed on time 
Data management structures and systems 
agreement 
8 2016/01/28 8 - Completed 2 months 
ahead of schedule 
Data gathering agreements 8 2016/01/28 8 - Completed on time 
Project Completion and Launch 5 2016/01/29 
2016/04/30 
5 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
TOTAL 60  60 -  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The post-lab technical review process conducted by the Working Group identified several areas that 
required changes in order to meet the intended objectives of the initiative (Bonga, M. Personal 
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interview, 10 October 2017). All activities related to this initiative have been completed. This initiative 
was a good example of the positive results that can be achieved through proper coordination and 
dedicated public employees. The success of this initiative could be attributed primarily to effective 
mandating and coordination mechanisms implemented by the Director General at DMR and the DU 
(Goodwin, C. Personal interview, July 2017). 
 
5.2.6. B1: Joint industry-government emergency response drills. Lead: DEA. Estimated investment: 
R13 million (Government: R7 million, Non-government: R6 million). 












Formalise IOC Participation 3 2014/12/31 3 - Completed on time  




4 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 




4 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
Ensure institutionalisation, operability and 
evolution of IMO through implementation of IMS 
Action Plan 
10 2017/09/30 5 - On track 
Pre-Emergency planning 7 2015/09/30 7 - Completed on time 
Emergency Response 6 2015/12/12 6 - Completed on time 
Emergency Response Training & Drills 2/4 2017/06/30 
2018/12/31 
1 - On track 
TOTAL 26/38  30 -  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The Working Group made some changes to improve on the original lab report. Some delays were 
experienced due to changes in areas of responsibility but the initiative is now on track for completion 
by the end of 2018 (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
5.2.7. E3: Promote awareness of the O&G industry. Led by DMR. Estimated investment: R8 million 
(Government funding only). 












Design the outreach component of the regulator 6 2015/12/31 6 - Completed on time 
Gap & needs analysis 2 2016/12/31 2 - Completed 6 months 
ahead of schedule 
Establishing the functions of "the regulator" 4 2017/12/31 1 -  
National Launch 1 2018/01/31 - -  
TOTAL 13  9 -  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The DU and DMR played a key role in driving this initiative. The initiate is on track for completion by 
early 2018 (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
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5.2.8. B2: Operationalise the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund. Led by DoT. 
Estimated investment: R0.7 million (Government: R300,000, Non-government: R400,000). 
Table 5-8: Initiative B2 – Projects and progress 








Agreement on disputed payment arrears 3 2014/12/15 
2015/02/28 
3 - Completed 3 months 
after revised due date 
Fully operational IOPC Fund 5 2015/03/31 5 -  
TOTAL 8  8 -  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
Historically, not all private sector members paid the requisite IOPC fees, owing to a lack of enabling 
legislation in South Africa. This resulted in arrears and therefore in the IOPC not being operational 
in South Africa. Subsequent to numerous deliberations in this workgroup, a decision was taken for 
the DU to intervene to ensure participation of National Treasury in the resolution of the matter 
(Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). Activities related to this initiative were completed 
primarily due to the initiative of and intervention by public employees. 
 
5.2.9. A1: Development of phased gas pipeline network. Led by DoE. Estimated investment: R1.8 
billion (Government: R26 million, Non-government: R1.74 billion). 
 
Representing the most ambitious and costly of the O&G initiatives, the phased development of a gas 
pipeline along the South African coastline is set to conclude in June 2021 with the finalisation of 
purchase agreements for the land required for the pipeline. The primary stakeholders in this initiative 
are iGas, PetroSA, DEA and the office of the Surveyor General. 
 
Table 5-9: Initiative A1 – Original projects 
Project (Final lab report) # Activities 
Completion 
target 
Establish Indicative Pipeline Costs 3 2015/09/01 






Route Engineering 6 2017/04/01 
Provisions of land from 
National Government 
6 2018/04/01 
Conduct Basic Assessment 6 2019/04/01 
TOTAL 28  
 
Table 5-10: Initiative A1 – Current projects and progress 









Establish Indicative Pipeline Costs 3 2015/09/01 3 - Completed 6 months 
ahead of schedule 
Secure Servitudes / 
reserves for 
pipelines 
Co-funding MoA 8 2016/05/05 8 - Completed on time 
Pre-strategic environmental 
assessment 
11 2016/10/10 11 - Completed on time 
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Establish PMC 3 2016/10/25 3 - Completed on time 
Proposals and consultant 
appointment 
9 2017/04/01 9 - Completed on time 
Service Level Agreement 3 2017/05/31 3 - Completed on time 
SEA project implementation 23 2018/11/30 - 1  
Development of regulations to secure energy 
servitudes from incompatible development 
8 2020/04/30 - - - 
Cabinet approval and gazetting of additional 
energy corridors and gas EMPR 
16 2020/03/31 - - - 
Business case, feasibility and servitude 
negotiations 
40 2021/03/31 - - - 
TOTAL 124  37 1  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The original three projects with 28 activities have been expanded to five projects with 124 activities 
as the Working Group found that the initial lab report omitted several key steps in the process and 
did not sufficiently consider the role of environmental impact assessments in the process. Initial 
disagreement on funding for the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) project was resolved 
through DU intervention (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
The first project of establishing indicative pipeline costs involved multiple government and non-
government stakeholders, was completed on time. The second project, securing servitudes/reserves 
for pipelines involving iGas, PetroSA, DEA and the Surveyor General is nearing completion. 
Implementation of the remaining three projects has not yet started. 
 
5.2.10.  D2: Develop capability for sub-surface research and data gathering. Led by PASA. 
Estimated investment: R264 million (Government only). 












Identify the Technical Capability built programmes 
for sub-surface information activities 
3 2014/11/01 
2014/12/01 
3 - Completed on time 
Review and Assess the Mechanism to formalise 
the Reservoir Technical Capability 
5 2015/07/31 
2016/08/01 
5 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 




4 -  
Confirm utilisation arrangements 3 2015/04/01 
2017/04/15 
3 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
Establish a multi-agency Ocean R&D Strategy 
and implementation programme 
8/7 2015/06/01 
2017/02/28 
7 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
TOTAL 25  22 -  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
Two major stakeholders (DEA and DAFF) essential to the implementation of this initiative did not 
participate in D2 Work Group meetings, resulting in decisions being delayed. This was escalated to 
the LCC by the DU but the matter could not be resolved.  The matter was ultimately resolved after 
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being escalated to the IMC, leading to an agreement to develop a joint funding proposal to National 
Treasury (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017).   
 
5.2.11. E2: Enhance environmental governance capacity of the O&G regulator. Led by DEA. 
Estimated investment: R11 million (Government funding only). 
Table 5-12: Initiative E2 – Projects and progress 









Project design 5 2014/10/08 -  Activities removed 
Establish a multi-stakeholder workgroup 5 2015/02/28 5 - Completed 1 month 
after due date 
Skills needs analysis 6 2015/03/31 6 - Completed on time 
Tender process and contracting 7 2015/02/24 -  Activities removed 
Scoping project inception 3 2015/03/31 -  Activities removed 
Identify service providers 6 2015/04/15 6 - Completed 4 months 
after due date 
International Benchmarking 4 2015/06/09 
2015/06/19 
4 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
Status Quo Report 4 2015/08/18 4 - Completed on time 
Stakeholder Engagement 8 2015/08/27 
2015/09/17 
8 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
Final Scoping Report 2 2015/09/24 2 - Completed on time 
Environmental Governance Performance 
Monitoring and Reporting 
6 2017/09/12 6 - Completed 6 months 
ahead of schedule 
Project Design 5/2 2016/01/29 
2015/12/17 
2 - Completed on time 
(revised schedule) 
Capacity Building Project Inception 3/19 2016/07/15 
2018/08/03 
7 2  
Capacity Building Project Implementation 1/5 2017/11/03 
2019/02/15 
- 1  
TOTAL 48/67  50 1  
Compiled from Operation Phakisa reporting data (DPME, 2017c) 
 
The post-lab technical review process identified several areas that required changes in order to meet 
the intended objectives of the initiative. The initiative is on track to meet its targets (Bonga, M. 
Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
 Oil and Gas: Summary and analysis 
The O&G focus area required the involvement of several government departments and agencies. 
Table 5-13 provides a summary of the achievement of targets for each initiative per lead department. 
The summary shows that achievements were mostly consistent, irrespective of the lead department. 
This suggests that either these departments are all generally efficient or that O&G coordinating 
mechanisms functioned properly (either by design or due to islands of effectiveness). Given the 
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Table 5-13: Summary of due activities completed / completed on time per lead department 
Lead Initiative % of due 
activities 
completed 









DHET D1 82% 100% 
DTI C1 100% 83% 







DoT B2 100% 50% 
DoE A1 97% 76% 
PASA D2 100% 86% 
Source: Author 
 
While the focus areas led by DEA (MPG) and DoT (MTM) did not perform well, their good 
performance in leading initiatives in the Oil and Gas focus area suggests that DMR and the O&G 
DU succeeded in designing and managing effective coordinating mechanisms. 
 
The governance structure adopted by the O&G focus area (Annexure 5) was more or less consistent 
with the framework suggested by DPME, with a strong focus on the DU and Steering Committee 
driving delivery. Working groups and the DU initially met weekly to ensure that work was prioritised 
and not treated as business as usual. Meetings later on became more ad hoc (only as and when 
required) with the role of the DU changing from primary convenor and driver of the process, to that 
of monitor (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
The O&G focus area accepted that there was insufficient time during the labs and that detailed 3-
feet plans would not be perfect. Their first task was therefore to confirm plans or to adjust plans 
where necessary to ensure that the objectives agreed on at the lab would be achieved. Changed 
plans were, depending on the nature of the change, referred to either the Steering Committee or the 
IMC for approval (Bonga, M. Personal interview, 10 October 2017). 
 
The Steering Committee met regularly (initially monthly and later quarterly). The LCC also met as 
required but was attended by representatives of the Directors General and not the DG’s themselves 
as originally intended. The IMC initially met monthly and later quarterly. Governance arrangements 
generally functioned well and supported the Operation Phakisa process (Bonga, M. Personal 
interview, 10 October 2017). There is no evidence to suggest that work in the O&G focus area was 
hampered by non-participation of key non-governmental stakeholders. 
 
The analysis shows that this focus area was more successful than others due to deliberate actions 
by individuals such as the Minister and Director General of DMR and the head of the O&G DU.  The 
analysis of the O&G focus area provides evidence of functioning accountability chains (NPM) as well 
Chapter 5 
- 71 - 
as the positive role of individual public entrepreneurs in achieving developmental results, with the 
latter playing a more significant role that the former. The detailed analysis confirms that this focus 
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 Conclusion 
6.1.1. Public sector reform 
The GTP demonstrated that the impact of government programmes can be improved by focusing on 
a set of clearly defined priorities with properly thought through implementation and monitoring plans 
(Xavier et al., 2016, p. 87). While the GTP experience has not proven which of the “best practice” or 
“best fit” approaches work best, it has proven the potential for success of a hybrid problem-solving 
model adapted to suit local context. (Xavier et al., 2016, p. 87). 
 
Both Malaysia and South Africa introduced public sector reforms based on NPM principles. In the 
case of Malaysia, economic as well as WGI data suggest that these reforms improved government 
performance and were therefore appropriate given the Malaysian political and institutional context.  
 
South Africa, originally on a dominant trajectory with relatively impersonal institutions, has moved to 
a competitive trajectory with increasingly personalised institutions. Economic indicators and WGI 
data confirm that the South Africa development project is failing or at least not proceeding at a 
sufficient pace. Comprehensive public sector reforms involving planning, monitoring and evaluation 
methodologies that relied on strong leadership and an ethos of accountability was therefore 
inappropriate given the South African context. 
 
Within this context, Operations Phakisa tested the political and institutional appetite for EBPM, 
compromise, and the willingness of politicians and government institutions to cede control (at least 
to some extent) to PE and MS driven processes to support sustainable development in South Africa. 
 
6.1.2. Operation Phakisa 
One of the main benefits of the Operation Phakisa methodology is that it introduced new ways of 
thinking about problems and of developing structures and processes involving multiple stakeholders 
to address these problems. This is an important departure from a system that is fundamentally 
fragmented, lacking in inter-agency trust with almost no effective coordination mechanisms. While 
the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa highlighted the importance of coordination among 
government departments and agencies, it was only moderately successful at achieving this.  
 
There is some evidence that the Ocean Economy lab has been successful at identifying and in some 
cases addressing legislative gaps or constraints to implementation (Britz, 2015). While this area is 
within the sphere of control of the government, the real determinant of the success of the process 
would have been the extent to which multiple stakeholders representing a wide range of interests 
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could be persuaded to work together (and make significant capital investments) to achieve mutually 
beneficial objectives.  Evidence suggests that the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa did not 
sufficiently explore opportunities in this space, especially in relation to building public-private sector 
trust relationships. 
 
The primary area of failure of Operation Phakisa is that it did not consider the prevailing political and 
institutional landscapes in South Africa and attempted to introduce a new methodology anchored in 
existing institutions.  While the authorising and decision-making environment within which Operation 
Phakisa operates is insufficiently robust and enabling, it did create the opportunity for individual 
actors to innovate, lead processes and drive implementation. 
 
Another important weakness of the Operation Phakisa methodology is that there is no dedicated 
budget allocated to the labs or focus areas. Participants (both government and private sector) are 
required to redirect existing funds (often to the detriment of other projects) to fund Operation Phakisa 
initiatives. This is a significant departure from the Malaysian model. It would appear that National 
Treasury is not sufficiently involved in or committed to the Operation Phakisa process. 
 
The Operation Phakisa Unit at DPME has neither been sufficiently capacitated nor does it have the 
same political influence when compared to its Malaysian counterpart. With only three senior officials 
and two support staff, this unit simply cannot play the important coordinating and facilitating role that 
it should be playing.  
 
While, in the case of Operation Phakisa, South Africa appears to have avoided the pitfalls associated 
with directly copying supposedly “best practices”, the local adaptation of the Malaysian BFR 
methodology is not yet delivering the desired results. This is indicative of a propensity of 
governments in developing countries to pursue change for the sake of greater legitimacy rather than 
better performance, or the isomorphism of being preoccupied with form rather than function (Levy, 
2014, p.206) 
 
The value of Operations Phakisa lies beyond the achievement of results in specific areas. It has 
brought into the spotlight the general weakness of the state to deliver, an inability to transform quickly 
and the challenge of building sustainable relationships between different actors that normally operate 
in bureaucratic silos, governed by legislation rather than a spirit of cooperation. 
 
The prognosis for Operation Phakisa, at least for now, is that results could be big, but are unlikely to 
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6.1.3. Islands of effectiveness 
In the absence of a strong public sector, islands of effectiveness could play an important role in the 
achievement of developmental objectives.  The South African and Malaysian models encouraged 
the involvement of relevant stakeholders from both the public and private sectors and the Malaysian 
model showed evidence of the relinquishing of significant control to multi-stakeholder governed 
initiatives in some areas. The Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa missed several opportunities to 
experiment with multi-stakeholder governed delivery transmission mechanisms in the South African 
context.   
 
Public servants played an important role in setting the agenda as well as in guiding the identification 
of focus areas and targets for the oceans economy. The ability of some officials to operate across 
multiple platforms and gain legitimacy with multiple stakeholders has been a key driver in the 
achievements of particularly the Oil and Gas focus area. While governance structures have generally 
failed, the abilities of both political actors and as well as public servants to navigate the complex 
terrain on this long road to accountability have been a key determinant in the few achievements to 
date.  Although this study attributes these achievements to public entrepreneurship, the form of 
public entrepreneurship that manifested during the Oceans Economy Operation Phakisa would 




Both Ministers Molewa (Environmental Affairs) and Minister Radebe (Minister in the Presidency) 
invested significant time and effort in the Oceans Economy Labs. The commitment by both these 
Ministers to make a success of this process is clear and admirable. The lack of a clear head of the 
process however contributes to delays in implementation. Either Minister Radebe or the President / 
Deputy President should be given a more prominent role, as the Malaysian model clearly shows the 
advantages of having a powerful and influential head of the process. 
 
The Operation Phakisa governance model is too complex and dependent on functioning public 
sector accountability chains.  Given the South African context, a governance model closer to the 
original proposal (Annexure 2) is more likely to be successful, provided that the roles and 
responsibility of participants are clearly defined and agreed upon. Mechanisms to entrench 
Operation Phakisa into the broader planning and M&E processes could ensure that its objectives 
become part of the performance agreements and daily tasks of government employees. 
 
The Malaysian model has shown that ring-fencing of funding for particular projects can contribute to 
success.  The South African approach where funding is dependent on individual departments re-
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allocating existing budgets creates significant risks.  National Treasury and DPME can play a more 
active role in this process.  
 
There could be more deliberate attempts at designing multi-stakeholder driven governance models 
for some initiatives.  This would reduce the risks associated with public sector accountability chains 
and is likely to improve performance in these areas. 
 
Oversight is unlikely to improve in the absence of a well capacitated DPME Operation Phakisa Unit.  
If the Operation Phakisa methodology is to play a significant role in future in developing and 
implementing policies, then the investment in more capacity in the DPME unit will be essential. 
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Annexure 3: Governance Structure: Oceans Economy Phakisa 
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Annexure 4a: Progress Report - Aquaculture 
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Annexure 4b: Progress Report – Offshore Oil and Gas 
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Annexure 4c: Progress Report – Marine Transport and Manufacturing 
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Annexure 4d: Progress Report – Marine Protection and Governance 
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Annexure 5: Proposed Oil & Gas Governance Structure 
 
Source: Operation Phakisa Documents (2014d) 
 
